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IN LUCE TUA
Comment on Contemporary Affairs by the Editor
Politics at the Crossroads
Everyone concedes that the Left in America is in
trouble . Its electoral losses have left it intellectually
confused and psychologically shaken. Liberal intellectuals run around in ideological circles, insisting that
Left assumptions need to be rethought but finding it
utterly impossible to agree on the direction such rethinking should take. Liberal politicians are, if anything, even more at sea: many Democrats criticized
their party's apologetic, nobody-here-but-us-moderates
response to President Reagan 's State of the Union address, but surely an ideological, highly combative tone
would have left the party open to the charge that it
had learned nothing from its string of political defeats.
For the moment, at least, the American Left's only
prospects for revival lie in the wan hope that the conservatives in power will manage to do themselves in
through ineptitude or scandal. Not much to build a
dream-or a politics-on .
And now political sociologist Alan Wolfe, writing in
the New R epublic (February 25), tells us that the Left's
doldrums are not restricted to America. His title, "The
Death of Social Democracy," summarizes his message.
Across Northern and Western Europe, parties of the
Left find themselves either out of power or, if in office, in a defensive and beleaguered state. Wolfe, who
is himself sympathetic to social democracy, argues that
this involves more than a temporary turn in the political cycle; the crisis of the democratic Left, he says, is
"deep, international, and probably permanent." (For
Wolfe, the terms "social democracy" and "democratic
socialism" appear essentially interchangeable; they
both describe the elaborate welfare state systems that
have been developed in the advanced capitalist states
of the Western world. In this perspective, the United
States would be located on the Right side of the socialdemocratic spectrum.)
Social democracy depended, ironically enough, on
the economic growth that Western capitalism provided. Out of capitalism's surplus, ocial welfare programs could be guaranteed. John Maynard Keynes
showed capitalists how to sustain growth, and growth
made possible ever-expanded social services. Prosperity and security advanced together-until, that is, the
straitened circumstances of the 1970s.
Virtually everywhere in the West in that decade the
same cns1s pattern occurred: economic stagnation accompanied by (and partially caused by) rapidly in-
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creased social spending by government. Voters finally
rebelled against rising tax rates and so governments
were forced to finance their new social programs by
borrowing. The economic result was stagflation: the
dispiriting combination of inflation and sluggish (at
best) growth. The political result was the frustration of
social democracy and the revival of conservatism. The
social impetus toward greater economic equality
stopped and calls for retrenchment increased. Social
democrats found it almost a relief in such circumstances to be out of power; who on the Left
wanted to hold office in an era whose felt necessity
was the cutting back of programs that justified the
Left's existence in the first place? As Wolfe puts it, "if
social democrats cannot offer expanded services, what
can they offer?" Let the Right preside over the death
of the dream.
It is difficult to know what to make of Wolfe's
prophecies. Caution is always in order when political
predictions are being tossed about. It was not that long
ago, after all, that obituaries were being written for
the Republican party. Wolfe's elegy for social democracy may well be premature; the democratic Left lies
wounded, but it is not yet slain. It is only in the long
run that we can distinguish between episod ic adjustments and permanent realignments. What Wolfe sees
as the end of an ideological era may be only a political
lull.
Yet if he is right, the politics of the West have
reached a critical juncture, and one that conse rvatives-as distinguished from radicals of the Rightmight be more leery of than wou ld at first be expected.
Wolfe himself suggests that the weakening of the
moderate Left does not necessarily signify the triumph
of conservatism. It may mean instead an era of
ideological confusion. Opposition to social democracy
has arisen on the Left as well as the Right, and at both
ends of the spectrum it often takes on anti-establishment, anti-politics, even irrationalist overtones. It is in
many ways a politics of cultu ral revolt that is difficult
to locate and define in terms of customary ideological
categories.
Wolfe argues that we may be witnessing the injection into politics of the modernist rebellion against
reason, order, and incremental progress that has been
so dominant a presence in twentieth-century art and
literature but which has not, with the notable exception of fascism in the interwar period, had much 1m3

pact on Western political life. As he puts it, "the demise of social democracy raises the disturbing possibility that the modernist consciousness, which earlier in
this century gave us chaos, atonality, and irrationality,
may come to affect our larger political sensibility."
At this point in Wolfe's analysis, one needs to tread
warily. Wolfe is making big leaps, and the direction of
his thought may be prompted by implicit ideological
assumptions. He appears too ready to identify political
rationality with social democracy. The rejection of the
democratic Left is not necessarily a retreat from
reason; it may simply be the recognition that social
democrats have in recent years flirted too closely with
political and cultural radicalism and have assumed
ideological and policy positions that do not conform
well either with social realities or with the beliefs and
values (themselves quite rational) of the people they
presume to represent. The democratic Left holds no
monopoly on moderation and reason ; Wolfe might do
well to consider the possibility that it is in fact social
democracy's drift toward extremism and sentimentalism that has brought it to its current low political estate.
Americans should be particularly cautious in applying Wolfe's analysis to their own situation (which, it
should be noted, Wolfe himself does not attempt to
do). Critics on the Left like to identify the rise of conservatism either with moral callousness (America the
meanspirited) or with political pathology (the paranoid
style), but to do so is to trivialize and rationalize away
a tendency that deserves serious and non-reductionist
attention. There are kooks and reactionaries on the
Right, but flaky behavior exists on the fringes of all
significant political movements. It is not a problem
peculiar to conservatism.
That said, American conservatives do need to be
careful that in their reaction against the perceived failures and inadequacies of the Left they not veer too abruptly to the Right. The debilitation of social democracy offers them unprecedented opportunities, but it
also presents seductive temptations. The antidote to a
played-out Left ought not be an over-zealous Right.
It is one thing, for example, to conclude that the
welfare state has gone too far and needs to be modestly pruned, quite another to insist that it be dismantled. Conservatives have a sound case to make that
preoccupation with economic security and tendencies
to egalitarianism have hurt the economy and fostered
unhealthy patterns of dependence among individuals.
No society or economy can remain vital that does not
encourage in its citizens the assumption that the responsibility for their own material well-being rests
primarily with themselves. (Liberals might resist that
notion as social policy, but let them ask themselves if
4

they do not, virtually without exception, attempt to implant it in their own children.) But resistance to the
welfare state must stop short-<:onsiderably short- of
adherence to social Darwinism. Conservatives who do
not understand that will not long stay in office, nor
will they deserve to. If social democracy is indeed
dead, it will leave as its legacy the apparatus of the
welfare state. Conservatives will need to learn how to
manage and restrain it, but they must not, for the sake
both of social decency and of their own political survival, attempt to do away with it.
More generally, conservatives need to resist the
temptation to turn themselves into mirror images of
the political tendencies they oppose. If social democracy damaged itself by edging too close to radicalism,
that should suggest a lesson from which conservatives
might benefit. Prudent conservatives need to distance
themselves from the true believers, the crackpot
populists, and the bitter-enders who would like to use
the present conservative revival for their own dubious
purposes.
In many Western countries, conservatives have
found themselves in power as much through the excesses of their political enemies as through their own
efforts. If they want to stay there-if they want to be
more than a momentary interlude in a continuing social-democratic political drama-they will forsake fantasies of a conservative counter-revolution and devote
themselves to construction of a social vision and program that integrates enduring conservative values with
the imperatives of modernity. If they can manage that,
perhaps they can in fact sentence social democracy, if
not to death, at least to a very long rest.

C:

Icarus
How could you have known it would be like this,
Balancing your body on the air, on nothing?
The wind in your throat, you move higher,
Your face a round dazzle of sun.
The sky takes you in.
Impatient, you beat your arms faster,
The wax softening, your freedom loosening.
And, when you fall,
It's with the stunned grace of a bird,
The sea smoothing your jagged wings.

Kim Bridgford
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Paul H . Brietzke

ABORTION lAW RECONSIDERED
Can There Be a Middle Way?

Many public policy issues are pressed upon bewildered Americans as dilemmas, as false dichotomies.
Abortion is an instructive example: either fetuses have
an absolute right to life or women have an untrammelled autonomy (including the freedom to choose an
abortion when pregnant) . Take it or leave it, you can't
have both. The reasons for this tendency are not hard
to discover. Both points of view are respectable
philosophically. They can be consistently maintained
with ingenuity-and only a bit of the disingenuousness
philosophers commonly use to demolish rivals. But
America is not nineteenth-century Germany; ideas
have little power to move (wo)men unless a well-organized political pressure group forms behind the
idea. The occasion for the forming of pro-life and
pro-choice groups (as they call themselves) was, of
course, Roe v. Wade in 1973. No case has so polarized
Americans since Dred Scott, or so some would argue. Is
it now possible to describe , in a somewhat neutral
fashion, what Roe has done to our society and polity,
and to point the way out of our dilemma? I will try.

Important bundles of rights and interests concerning women, fetuses, special interest groups, various
branches and levels of government, and, perhaps, society itself emerged in response to rapid changes in
medical technology and in the mores of some groups.
These bundles grew into conflict with each other so
quickly that the legal system was caught unprepared.

Paul H. Brietzke is Professor of Law at Valparaiso University. He received his B .A . from Lake Forest College, his J.D .
from the University of Wisconsin, and his Ph.D. from the
University of London. He is the author of Law, Development, and the Ethiopian Revolution (Bucknell University
Press, 1982). His current research interests are in law and
economics and in antitrust law.
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Fetal protection had earlier been accomplished under
a legal indirection; the state of medicine and mores
made it unnecessary to raise and judge fetal interests
explicitly, even as the law tried to see pregnancies carried to term. Several states began experimenting with
abortion law reform. In retrospect, it might have been
wiser to let these experiments go further and observe
their effects before announcing a nationwide rule. But
the Supreme Court rushed in headlong. The Court
knew that politicians would duck the increasinglythorny issue of abortion for as long as possible, and
that the eventual outcome would look like the Missouri
Compromise: a politically expedient, unprincipled
stopgap. In the meantime, many women would die or
be injured by backstreet abortionists who, like drug
pushers and porno merchants, benefit from a protective economic tariff conferred by law.
An irresistible force met its immovable object in
1973. The Roe Court found a "fundamental" woman's
right, limited by a "compelling state interest" nonetheless, and this initially-radical change in abortion policy
has remained more or less static ever since. The fundamental-ness of woman's right causes problems, particularly as the Court seldom uses this term. Abortion
is a sub-species of the right to privacy, itself a vague
and recently recognized (some would say recently discovered) right. In the nature of things, a fundamental
right can be limited only when it conflicts with another
fundamental right: here, the prevention of harm to
others. Because the State can seldom resist the temptation of self-aggrandizing claims to represent inchoate
"others" (the "Silent Majority" or policies for "our" national security), infringing in the process the individual
autonomy that is at the core of liberalism, the Court
felt it necessary to hold the balance over abortion.
That is, woman's right is declared dominant in the
first trimester of pregnancy, while the State's interest
becomes progressively more compelling during the
second and third trimesters.
Why does this compelling state interest suddenly
spring up? The State does not exercise fetal rights by
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proxy, smce the Roe Court held that fetuses are not
"persons" entitled to rights protected under the fourteenth amendment. This seems the only possible holding, so long as the jurisprudence of fetal interests and
rights (a lex imperfecta, fetuses having no duties correlative to "their" rights) remains in its undeveloped state.
Here, in contrast to its analysis of woman's privacy
right, the Roe Court took refuge in a lack of authority,
authority to base a compelling state interest on the disputable premise that life begins at conception. All of
this somehow changes after the fetus becomes "viable,"
potentially capable of surviving outside the womb albeit with artificial aid. Then, logic and biology are said
to dictate that, if not alive, the fetus is at least almost
alive. The State's interest in protecting the fetus then
overrides woman's privacy.

The Court is prepared to second-guess
a legislature whose purported concern
for maternal health is felt to be a
stalking-horse for a premature
concern about the fetus, or a
catering to interest-group pressures
unrelated to maternal health.

The fragility of this whole argument is probably the
reason why the indisputable policy of protecting maternal health became the touchstone for many of the
abortion restrictions the Colll·t tolerates. The Court is,
however, prepared to second-guess a legislature whose
purported concern for maternal health is felt to be a
stalking-horse for a premature concern about the
fetus , or a catering to interest-group pressures unrela ted to maternal health . Such second-guessing hardly
began with the Burger Court in Roe, since it accounts
for some of the brightest stars in the Warren Court's
(liberal, result-oriented) fii·mament. As in earlier
school desegregation and death penalty cases, the
Court seeks to make policies for what it thinks a
civilized society can and ought to become.
This is not the stuff of which "neutral principles" of
constitutional law are made, yet the Court seemed to
err in seeking neutrality along two paths. First, it refused to base its decision on religio-philosophical
grounds which do not command a consensus. Now,
much of law is and sho uld be based on morality . But
morality is not all of one piece, and its relation to law
is not direct. Law is social, objective, and coercive;
morals are individual, subjective, and voluntary. Advocates of a morality do benefit from successfully invok-
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ing government's power. Such benefits are, indeed,
guaranteed by the law of our liberal democracy, but
on ly up to the point where this morality conflicts with
other moralities which have similarly obtained a legal
recognition. If it were otherwise, if the morality of one
group or law were allowed to override all others, a religio-philosophical absolu tism wou ld become a political
authoritarianism under law.
Life's beginning at conception, or at birth , can be
and is the foundation of a comprehensive moral code.
Under the morality of our law-which is pragmatic because it cannot be anything else in a liberal democracy
moved by an interest-group pluralism-such a code is
not violated by Roe; each group keeps controversial religio-philosophic beliefs to itself and does not restrict
freedom by imposing its beliefs on others. We learned
this lesson during Prohibition, but the error in the
Court's line of thought is that it pleases almost no one.
We want law to embody our aspirations and convictions, and to be something more stable and fundamental.
The Roe Court's second error was to rely so heavily
on medical practice and opin ion. Doctors are given
much discretion over decisions to abort, and the state
of their art in 1973 is the basis for the Court's analysis
of abortion by the trimesters. Presumably, the Court
was trying to lower the temperature of debate over
abortion by generating neutral principles drawn from
a supposed ly value-free science. As with contraception,
the Court hoped that safe, cheap, and effective
methods of abortion would lessen the need for, and
the desire for, legal restrictions. Unlike school prayer,
the need for an abortion and, perhaps, the beginnings
of life cou ld seemingly be treated as empirical questions. These could then be answered by a medical profession which had shown little interest in religiophilosophical entanglements.
But it turns out that there are seldom any purely
medical reasons for an abortion, and none at all for
life's beginnings or its val ue. Further, as medical
technologies continue to improve, the Roe trimesters
are now caught in a technology crunch: the abortion
patients' "window of vulnerability" gets smaller and
smaller as safe abortions are performed later and
later, while the fetal "window of opportunity" gets
larger and larger as fetuses survive earlier and earlier.
II

Roe touches a nerve rubbed raw by altruism, perceived self-interest, and, for some, frustration in the
sexual, family, religious , and career activities through
wh ich we try to express ourselves. Partisans on both
sides took to the streets. They have fought hard, each
The Cresset

side feeling that it can win or lose everything at the
turn of a case or statute. The battle has given rise to
more extremist tactics and more dubious euphemisms
than any other dispute, since Vietnam at least. A careful review of arguments on both sides shows them to
consist largely of gibberish, emotive words used inaccurately, false or imperfect analogies, tasteless oversimplifications, cynical manipulation of narrow values
so that they override and restructure other values into
a life centering on abortion issues, and/or reflexive attacks on rival arguments (any which fail fully to fit
cherished preconceptions). Try as it might, the Court
can find nothing in this mess to indicate a sensible direction for future policies. Each group will automatically push a favorable policy judgment to extremes, regardless of rationality. Any rent which appears in the
thinly-stretched policy fabric of abortion is ruthlessly
manipulated for advantage.
A policy politics thus became its own cause: the
"duopoly" of politically-effective views on abortion
gave rise to a perfect indeterminacy of result, given
the rivals' inability to agree on anything. Having first
found succor in the Court under Roe, pro-choice
groups continue to go there and to portray themselves
as the kind of civil rights/civil liberties organizations
that the Court should want to help. Pending new
Court appointments, pro-life groups seek legi lative
and executive help by presenting themselves both as
holders of the high moral ground and as single-issue
constituencies capable of determining election results.
The success of pro-life groups, measured in terms of
the number and range of pitfalls laid for the Court,
has been impressive. The Court has felt beleaguered
and compelled to develop techniques for defending its
Roe policies against a quick succession of sharp attacks.
The Court cannot move forward while in this defensive posture; the course of abortion policy from 1974
to date has been a zig in favor of one group and a zag
in favor of the other. Always the Court brings abortion policy back as close to the dead-center of Roe as
can be managed under the circumstances. Growing
angry at the close variations on prohibited themes (obtained by pro-life groups from state legislatures), the
Court reached a series of loophole-closing decisions
which seem to favor pro-choice groups. On the other
hand, the Court expanded parental rights over their
minor children who seek abortion. It upheld broad restrictions on the public funding of abortion as consonant with a newly recognized/discovered "significant"
state interest in promoting ct.ildbirth.
These decisions may display a cruel value bias: "You
can have an abortion if you're not too young or poor."
A kindlier explanation is that these cases show the
abortion right to be so firmly anchored in an indiMarch, 1985

vidualistic liberty interest that there is no need or desire to hold this interest in dynamic tension with our
other significant constitutional value: equality in the
exercise of a right. This libertarianism winds up a rejection of one paternalism, of public payment for
abortion, for another paternalism of promoting
childbirth. It is hard to see how the Court could have
it any other way. Other issues in abortion policy are
feasible realms for judicial activism; little judicial control over the sword is needed, and none over the
purse. But effectively mandating a public funding for
abortion would require a degree of control over the
public purse which courts lack.
The Supreme Court is at the end of its tether over
abortion. No significant legal innovation can be carried
through in one case decision; Brown v. Board of Education did, after all, order school desegregation "with all
deliberate speed." Not having been allowed by the
combatants to develop Roe further, the Court built a
wall around it. This wall is so ugly that connoisseurs
of a doctrinal architecture are outraged, and it is so
rigid that abortion policy cannot get out. The Court's
legitimacy is put at risk by an important policy stance
that has provoked vociferous opposition for twelve
years. Opponents may yet seize the means, perhaps
the Constitution itself, to overrule Roe-and even to
overthrow the Court. The costs of this policy standoff
over abortion are immense, particularly if measured
by the time devoted to the issue by judges, legislators,
bureaucrats, pressure groups, and the media. Their
time could be better spent investigating solutions to
other policy problems.

III
Many a logician would see a ready solution to our
dilemma: forget the Court and pass between the horns
of the false dichotomy (a policy problem poorly put)
of pro-choice versus pro-life. We should be able to
find an Aristotelian mean between the extremity of results obtained by focusing on either women's or fetal
rights. To rectify the lex imperfecta of these rights,
rights tied to each other in biology (pending new
technologies) if not under present laws and ideologies,
a correlative duty should be imposed on the right that
serves to terminate the fetus. Like the right, this duty
shou ld fall on women, their doctors, and, less directly,
on all of us: to demonstrate respect for life, born and
unborn, as an end rather than a means to some other
goal. The abortion debate has twisted "life" to mean
either a mere physical existence or participation in a
free-wheeling, middle-class dream. Life means both of
these things simultaneously in America, plus, for
some, the effects of poverty, sexism, racism, and the
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desperate search for someone to love.
On close examination, there turns out to be very little respect for life in America. The sprawling media
vulgate of a commercialized "lifestyle" and many of
our public policies reflect this sorry fact. It is obvious
that many of us cannot manage sex and other aspects
of intimate relations sensibly. We seem to want it both
ways, demanding self-fulfillment and sexual titillation
while, at the same time, recognizing these demands to
be frequently tawdry, doomed to frustration, and inconsistent with the Victorian, puritanical heritage that
is itself deeply contradictory. Our muddle bears down
most cruelly on the many teenagers who are becoming
sexually active earlier (regardless of the availability of
abortion), and who then face a more protracted struggle of love, desire, and acquiring the financial and social means sensibly to give effect to these emotions. If
we cannot cope, what hope for our courts and legislators?
Even those legislators ostensibly dedicated to a right
to life are reluctant to put their money where their
mouths are, into such demonstrably-successful alternatives to abortion as sex education and contraceptives,
adoption information and support, and better medical
care, nutrition , tax benefits, and educational and occupational assistance for mothers who wish to keep their
children. Forced to choose, most of these legislators
prefer policies associated with a traditional morality, a
fiscal "responsibility," and a keeping of the Welfare
State at bay (while, perhaps, increasing military
budgets and tax breaks for corporations).
Legislators may thus deserve rebuffs by the courts
and taunts from the likes of Barney Frank, such as:
"The right to life begins at conception and ends at
birth." If nothing is done to curb medical and childrearing costs and the feminizing of poverty, the right
of autonomy and choice that must be part of a fullyelaborated respect for life will be illusory for increasing numbers of women. Any society capable of desegregating southern schools and putting a man on the
moon can, if it wishes, markedly decrease the number
of unwanted pregnancies.
Decreasing the number of abortions that prove
necessary over time is a policy around which a consensus could form. Weary. from the abortion wars, the uncommitted bulk of the populace would go along, as
would many pro-life and pro-choice supporters. The
excess baggage of symbolism and ideology, more than
abortion (or any other) policy can bear without collapsing under the weight, should be discarded. Diehard
extremists would remain , but these could logically, and
fairly, be accused of preferring principles to fetuses.
Politicians should be able to muster the courage to
move extremists, gently but firmly , from the center of
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the policy arena to its fringes.
Extremist concerns would then be respected as fully
as the overall consensus allows. Real (substantive)
choice should be expanded and legal (formal) choice
constrained, in a compromise enhancing the value of
choice and life alike. Carrots being more effective than
sticks here, the duty would best be implemented by
decreasing the costs of, and increasing the benefits
from , preferred alternatives to abortion: abstinence ,
contraception, and having and caring for the child .
To remedy the lex imperfecta discussed earlier, the
right to control one's body should have as a correlative
duty the choice of one of these preferred alternatives
to abortion. Privacy requires that there be no prior restraint on this choice, but the reasons for choosing
abortion could be the subject of an after-the-fact
evaluation. If a genuinely free choice is found to result
in an abortion, a sanction demonstrating society's respect for life could be imposed for breach of the correlative duty.
Perhaps the best sanction is a community service
order, a fixed number of hours that must be spent in
social service at a school, hospital , senior citizen's
center, etc. This sanction would fall on women who
elect abortion "voluntarily," without rape, incest, unforeseeable dangers to health, or mental incapacity,
and despite full access to an expanded range of choice:
to sex education, contraception, and the means for
childrearing. Under an ideal morality, this sanction
would also fall on men. Pragmatically, the difficulties
of identifying the man and the possibility of false identifications would mean that the duty follows the right
in falling primarily on the woman. The burden would
be less than at present, however, because of an expanded range of meaningful choice.
The costs of the due process necessary before a
sanction could be imposed on a woman are high , but
probably no higher than costs of the present system.
There would be other costs, too: in a severing of some
of the remaining links to a traditional morality and an
idealized picture of family life in the past. But these
evaporate under close examination, as representations
of a golden age that never was. Finally, the notion of
a community service order imposed after an abortion
may seem repugnant to us, as a modern-day version
of Hester Prynne's Scarlet Letter: "A" for Abortion
rather than for Adultery. If so, we may be reflecting
the concern for women's privacy and f eelings that the
Court sought to implement in Roe v . Wade. If costs
and competing moralities and policies continue to
block a more comprehensive approach to abortion
such as the one I outline, this may prove that the Roe
scheme is the best we can expect and deserve for abortion.

••••
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James D. Black

THINKING ABOUT "HORSEY"
On Games Children Play (or Don't Play)

A few weeks ago I was trying to teach May Sarton's
delightful little poem, "The Centaur," to a rather reluctant high school group. You may recall the poem,
which looks back to youth when the author could
spend a joyful afternoon riding a stick horse and pretending to be both rider and horse. For me the poem
wonderfully evokes the happy fantasy play of my own
childhood, though it makes it sadly obvious that we·
cannot go back to those days.
My students didn't find the poem either happy or
sad. Rather, they thought it was silly and stupid. "You
mean she cut a stick and pretended it was a horse?"
"When she talks about a green mouth, you mean she
was actually chewing grass?" I asked them if they had
played "Horsey" when they were younger. "No," they
chorused. I was about to conclude that perhaps they
had played "Horsey" but were too embarrassed to
admit it when I thought to ask another question:
"How about playing 'Cowboys and Indians'?" Again,
"No." Relentlessly (foolishly) I pursued the questioning: "How about 'Cops and Robbers'? 'Fireman'?
'Store'? 'Doctor and Nurse'? 'Invaders froms Mars'?" I
named every fantasy game I could recall or invent.
The answer was still "No."
Finally I asked, "What did you play when you were
kids?" I should have known better than to ask, because
I feared a truthful answer. I heard it: "I played my
stereo."
So far as I know , no investigator or agency has ever
asked this question, and the answer is one you certainly won't find in the reports from the President's
Commission on Education or from the Carnegie
Foundation. My own library is quickly filling up with
these and similar books which belabor me with SAT
scores, Carnegie units, required credits, hours of

James D. Black is a high school English teacher in Louisa
County, Virginia. His first article in The Cresset, "On
Being a Good Teacher," appeared in January.
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homework-numbers, all neatly added and multiplied ,
normed, Chi-squared, deviated, and arranged in neat
little matrices. But nowhere in this statistical cornucopia have I seen data indicating that children don't
play "Horsey" any more.
So what? Does it matter that children don't play
"Horsey" any more but play their stereos instead? I
think that it matters a great deal, because it is
symptomatic of more widespread and pervasive
changes in the play and reading habits of our children. It seems obvious to me that without a proper
diet of fantasy and role-playing, our children will grow
up with impoverished imaginations. Homo gravis rather
than homo ludens, or homo sapiens.

Does it matter that children don't
play "Horsey" any more but play their
stereos instead? It matters a lot.
It's a thought which has been a long time growing.
should have reached the same conclusion several
years ago, when I read a story about a second-grade
teacher who insisted that her students tour a sewage
treatment plant, saying, "It's about time these kids
learned something about the real world." Even then I
questioned whether age seven is the proper time to
learn about the real world, at least not in the sense this
second-grade teacher seemingly intended. I thought
then that we should leave the child alone with his belief in hobgoblins , Santa Claus, and the Easter Bunny
still intact. Childhood is the time for imaginary playmates and babbling to oneself, for drinking imaginary
tea from imaginary cups. It's the time for Jack-tales
and playing store. The child will learn soon enough
about hot fires and eat's claws, much less nuclear
weapons and sewage treatment plants.
During the years since I first cringed at this story of
the grim-faced (at least I imagine her to be grimfaced) second-grade teacher, I have had other hints
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that homo gravis was evolving at an ever-faster rate. I
met more and more of them in my classes and tried
to teach them , but I had no name for the species, and
I couldn't quite envision that it was a new species, different in kind as well as in degree . My recent experience with "The Centaur" was an epiphany: suddenly
I realized that I was facing more and more students
who were not just less capable, but totally incapable of
imaginative involvement or creative empathy.
Which leads me back to my hypothesis, that the lack
of childhood fantasy and play leads to an impoverished imagination. I decided to test it the other
day in a quasi-scientific manner. I took a few minutes
from each of my best English classes and polled the
students by asking the same questions about playing
fantasy games when they were children. Oh, how predictable! A substantial majority grinned with remembered joy and chorused "Yes! " to my questions . In
fact, I had to quiet them down rather firmly, for they
were noisily volunteering anecdote after anecdote.
And what about the silent ones, those who evidentl y
hadn't played "Horsey"? I noted who they were and
did an "eyeball" correlation with their grades. Yes,
they were the ones whose grades ranked toward the
bottom of their groups.
One more informal poll ended my research for the
day. I asked the students in these better groups if they
had had imaginary playmates when they were children. A lesser number answered in the affirmative ,
and another crude correlation appeared: those who
had enjoyed the companionship of imaginary playmates tended to be my AlB students.
I began to recall other patterns I've noticed over the
years, patterns which are equally suggestive of a connection between childhood imagination and later
achievement in literature classes. You English teachers
might try a few additional polls of your classes to see
if your observations agree with mine. Identify your
students who truly enjoy poetry and excel at either
reading or writing it, who have rhythms built into
their brains and who can really comprehend
metaphors rather than just identify similes by the presence of "like" or "as. " Then find out which members
of your classes were heavily exposed to nursery
rhymes when they were young children. If your students are like mine, you'll find a substantial positive
correlation between the two groups.
Is there a similar correlation between the reading of
fairy tales and Robin Hood, and a later interest in historical novels? Between reading Winnie the Pooh and
one's later enjoyment of "The Nun's Priest Tale"? Between a child's making up of stories to accompany the
illustrations in a book or catalogue, and his later ability, not just to create stories, but to analyze character
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and motivation and the effects of setting? I think so,
and my informal polls tell me so.
Perhaps I shouldn't push my hypothesis too far, for
my research is far too crude and too anecdotal to be
anything more than suggestive. Moreover, it's glaringly
obvious that a chicken-or-egg question confronts me:
isn't it possible, even likely, that the child who plays
fantasy games or who has an imaginary playmate is innately more imaginative? Why assume that childhood
play made him more imaginative?
I choose to assume this for the obvious reason that
his childhood fantasy play could hardly have stunted
the child's imagination-even if he were innately more
imaginative, his experiences could only have nurtured
and increased this capacity. Besides, I truly enjoy my
hypothesis, for it allows me to argue for child-rearing
practices I already like. It reinforces my prejudice toward play and nursery rhymes and fairy tales: I'd
rather cut a stick and play "Horsey" with a child than
chaperone him through a sewage treatment plant.

I have many reasons to be prejudiced
in favor of childhood play and its
companion, classic children's
literature. Children learn of others
through imaginative play and reading.
I do have many reasons to be prejudiced in favor of
childhood play and its companion, classic children's literature. I choose to believe that a young child learns
about others through imaginative play and imaginative
literature. Perhaps we have gone much too far in our
insistence that all education must be related to the
child's experience. It keeps his perspective too insular
and permits him to remain too much the egocentric
creature he was born. E. E. Cummings may lament the
loss of "the world of born," but surely a sense of
others, a widening of perception so as to include other
times and other places, is part of a desirable "made"
world.
Paradoxically, perhaps, I also choose to believe that
imaginative play and imaginative literature enable a
child to know himself better. As he assumes the role
of the knight or the beast, as he hears or reads about
heroes or monsters and villains, even as he learns
about good little children and evil step-mothers, he
will identify within his one self all of these selves; and
if his play is good and his literature well-chosen, he
will be steered to favor the finer feelings. He will
know his own potential for evil, but he will find that
many childhood games distinguish between the good
The Cresset

and the bad, and the rules say that the good should
win. Likewise, he will learn from classic children's literature to distinguish clearly between the good and the
bad, and the strong and the helpless. He will learn to
choose the good and to help those in need.
So let's be safe. Even if we are merely assuming
rather than knowing, let's assume that we should cultivate imagination in our children because we want
children with imaginations, and to do nothing is too
dangerous. The alternative, homo gravis, is too fearsome to consider. He isn't May Sarton's centaur with
a horse's body and a human head, but very nearly the
reverse, more bran and bray than brains, more cunning than imagination . Unlike Shakespeare's Bottom,
with his enormous faith in imagination, in art as reality, homo gravis will never roar like a lion, but he will
wear an ass's noll-with headphones.
I do believe that there are clear educational and
moral implications in the playing of "Horsey" and the
reading of classic children's literature. You English
teachers, you probably have already encountered homo
gravis in your classes. He is the one who cannot understand a pun or unlock a metaphor because he cannot
play with words or images. He has no feeling for tone
because he cannot imagine the author's voice or feelings. He hates biography because he has no ability to
enter a life other than his own. Don't expect him to
enjoy reading The Hobbit or A Wrinkle in Time, nor to
learn from them, because the moral fable and moral
fantasy will be to him truly bizarre genres which will
elicit coarse laughter and the summary, all-purpose
dismissal, "This stuff is dumb." In fact, if he likes any
literature at all (other than sports or car stories), his
favorites will be selected from the weaker selections in
the so-called "Young Adult" genre because here he
can find books which are so nearly autobiographical
that he re-reads his own life. Homo gravis wants no
"book like a frigate to take him miles away."
No doubt homo gravis takes classes other than my
English course, and no doubt his lack of imagination
limits him as severely in algebra as it does in English.
Tell homo gravis to let "X" equal an unknown number,
and he will stare blankly. In history class, ask homo
gravis to enter and re-live another era, and you will get
the same reaction I get when I ask him to read a biography or a fantasy. I leave it to you philosophers to
decide if you dare ask homo gravis to understand the
monads of Leibnitz. And you other members of the
academy, surely you can identify him in your classes
through some comparable process.
Perhaps I am a little too Swiftian. I, like Gulliver,
seem to be finding the company of horses preferable
to the company of my own species. Let us hope that
I am exaggerating the numbers of homo gravis and that
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I am caricaturing his academic and moral weaknesses.
Let us hope that he will indeed prove to be both homo
sapiens and homo ludens. Let us hope that his inner
landscape is filled with images of the good and the
bad, of both strength and weakness, the helpers and
the helpless, of virtue and vice. Heaven help all of us
who desire that homo gravis recognize the ugly in himself and others, and learn to abhor it-and Heaven
again help all of us who so fervently want him to conCl
ceive of an afterlife and a God .

Two Sonnets: For My Mother

Sunset

Alone on the front porch, she lifts
her left hand to shade her eyes
from the sun as it passes behind
ragged trees, their leaves blowing
over the hardening ground around her.
Resting a sweater across her shoulders
to protect against the sudden chills
that work their way in from the ocean
each of these early October evenings,
she listens to the slow whistle of wind
and whispers to herself, Tonight
it sounds as if someone were weeping.
And though three-quarters of a continent
separates us, I hear each word she speaks.
After Learning of Your Illness

Waking early, I watch from my window
the winding drifts of chimneys
and the white shreds of smoke trailing
exhausts of automobiles. I see
how they rise and depart into the cold air,
into the sleep I have left behind.
As the warmth disappears above the homes
of neighbors, an island of clouds
struggles over the western range and edges
into the valley. Branches of trees
swept clean by the wind are easily stirred,
each end pointing in a different direction.
I turn away, close the curtains, and create
a calmness I know will never last.

Edward Byrne
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Jay C. Rochelle

THE SPIRITUAL IN ART
Specifying the Ineffable

If you look at two pieces of art and ask the difference between them, various answers may be forthcommg:
"The one is original, the other one seems not to
be ...
"The artist is herself in this one ...
"You see a balance or a harmony at work .. .
"This one has clarity and sureness of stroke .. .
"This has simplicity; no excess work .. .
"I feel more coming from this one .. .
"Let's face it: this one's got spirit!"
Our responses show that one work has, for us, a certain quality, identified but not fully defined by the
comments we make about that work. The medium is
of moment only if we are concerned with technical
mastery. The threshold of genuine art is that doorway
which divides technique from a spiritual quality, an essence we can point to but not fully articu late.
The comments from our imaginary walk through
the gallery are typical. Let us consider the key words
we find in them.
Originality. This does not mean that the subject has
never been covered before, nor that the subject has
been deliberately treated in a novel way. Novelty may
be only a gimmickry, though every original work of
art participates in the birth of the truly new in the relationship between the work and ils audience. It is a
birthing process, a mothering from which the original
emerges.
Originality means the artist brings forth and upholds a vision of life which is intensely and deeply personal in such a way that the vision is seen and touched
by others. Originality is that qual ity which pertains
when the medium provides the ground upon which

J ay C. Rochelle is Assistant Professor of Worship and Dean
of the Chapel at the Lutheran School of Theology at Chicago.
His several contributions to The Cresset include "Waiting:
A Meditation on Death and Life" (September, 1981).
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the artist's truth is manifest. By a strange turn of
events, that which is most deeply personal is also recognized by others as that which is universal, and herein is its originality.
Expression of self. When we say the artist came to
him or herself in the work, we mean that the core of
being and becoming, the very inmost self which is elusive and yet real, the self one knows oneself to be, is
located and articulated in such a way as to be redolent
with a transcendent quality which speaks to other persons.
Self-expression is not to be confused with either narcissism or exhibitionism, both of which are perversions-sidelines from the true course of self-expression. Narcissism is misdirected love which finds its object by reversion to an imagined self while neglecting
the course of love which would reach out and embrace
and join with others. It is love curved in upon itself
and unable to relate directly to the other; it must first
check its own pulse before being able to respond to
the pulse of another. This is not the self-expression
which inspires one in a work of art.
Exhibitionism is the frustrated attempt to express
the self; it remains at a level of frustration because one
confuses the superficial with the real, mistaking the
external for the inner, in a rush of concern for image
at the expense of reality.
Harmony. Technically, harmony is considered a
matter of composition. When the elements in a picture
are in balance, harmony is said to be achieved. When
posilive and negative spaces are in complementary relationship, then harmony is said to be achieved.
While this technical definition is correct, the deeper
meaning of harmony has to do with more than the
mastery of technique, especially since all of us know
artworks which succeed spiritually in spite of their lack
of balance; to me, Picasso's Guernica is one such example.
Harmony is a term we rightly identify with music.
The interplay of light and shadow, black ' and white,
line and color, sets up a pattern of vibrations or waves
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which is interpreted by one's kinesthetic sense as
"harmonious," though the initial sense may be sight or
hearing--or even taste (the art of cooking is said to
consist in the balancing of the six qualities : sweet and
sour and so forth) . Harmony is the pleasing arrangement of parts to one another, so that there is an emotional element in the discernment of harmony as well
as an intellectual one. A synonym from music is "consonance."
This consonance which is an attribute of an artwork
speaks to the viewer by means of resonance with our
sense of balance and harmony .
The precise point at which harmony is recognized is
the transition. When you drive through a tunnel in
bright daylight, you have two unmistakable moments
of transition. When first entering the tunnel you
notice the pitchblackness which is followed by the ordinary dark; when leaving the tunnel you notice the brilliance which is followed by the ordinary light. The
pitchblack and the brilliance are the transitional moments where, briefly, light and dark are balanced-as
at the mysterious times of dawn and dusk. The word
"dawn" comes from OE dagian, to become day, and
thus is a word bespeaking the promise of resolution of
dark into light; the dusk is from ME dose, darkness,
which bespeaks the promise of resolution of the waning into night.
All opposites and dualities seek harmony and that
harmony is also known as tension. The primary tension in art is between image and reality-the form/
shadow dialectic-but so also is the primary harmony,
which is why art expresses human creativity. The creative act is a transitus-a passage, a pathway, a tunnelwherein image and reality become, momentarily, one,
even though the tension remains.
The ear hears in each moment the becoming and
the decay of all that is by sound revealed: "The old
pond, ah! A frog jumps in: the water's sound" (Basho,
1644-1694). A frog jumps in and the true nature is
known; speech and silence are the points of oscillation,
even as a sound wave crests and ebbs so that sound is
only known in relationship to silence and vice versa.
Everything is known in its opposite even as hatred is
known in love and life is known in death.
Harmony is a balance where one still recognizes the
inevitable presence of the opposites in a duality. This
is known technically as the afterimage, where red is
"remembered" in after-image as green and yellow in
its after-image is purple. The dualities remain even in
the harmony.
Clarity. This does not mean clarity of presentation
in the sense of graphic realism. Sureness applies under
the rubric of furyu-a Japanese term which refers to
the elusive quality of controlled spontaneity. This is
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what we mean by clarity: it is a quality achieved because the artist quite simply knew what he or she was
doing, knows the form and the content from inside
out. This "from inside out" is the truest phrase because it means all art is an expression of the deeper
self, which is single and whole and therefore clear.
The deeper self is unfettered by explanation, discourse, categorization, and quantifications of all kinds;
the deeper self simply is, and is simply.
Simplicity. The display of simplicity in form, line,
color, text, weight-in the visual code in general-is an
indicator, though not a proof, that the artist has
arrived at a point of simplicity in his or her inner life.

The display of simplicity in form,
line, color, text, and weight is an
indicator that the artist has found
simplicity in his or her inner life.
Feeling. Feeling is that aspect of humanity which
knows by participation rather than by intuition or intellection, and aside from representation, that is, without the mediation of ideas. Husser! saw feeling as the
nonintentional , "hyletic" (that is, perceptive of prime
matter or what Aquinas called pure potentiality) process of consciousness which involved values and valuing. It is thus a direct knowledge rather than an indirect or discursive logic ("discursive" means "running
about" from one topic to another). Feeling is the aspect of humanity where the Buddhist teaching of Zen
(sitting meditation) as "direct seeing into the nature of
reality" makes sense, if anywhere.
When we speak of feeling more from one artwork
as over against another, we are making a statement
that the one has a greater value than the other for us.
This value-more quality is an intimation of transcendence, which is the great awesome beyond beckoning
us through all the values of life. When we assign a
hierarchy of values based on our feeling, our participatory knowledge of the world, we are also become
aware of that which is beyond the evanescent and permutant forms of the world. Says Czeslaw Milosz, "the
poet ... can only be faithful to real things by arranging them hierarchically." Even as value is rooted in
feeling so is aesthetic sensibility. They go together. We
value what we prize, and we prize what appears to us
as beautiful.
Feeling seeks three things at once: wholeness, wellbeing, and rightness. Nothing deadens feeling so
much as the absence of these qualities from one's experience. Injustice, imbalance, illness, fragmentation,
and dissolution are deadly to the knowing which takes
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place by feeling. Thus in seeking out that which inspires in art one looks for wholeness, wellbeing, and
rightness as the ground of feeling. When a piece of art
inspires feeling it is these three qualities which are first
known in the interchange between the viewer and the
piece of art. This search for wholeness, wellbeing, and
rightness has nothing to do, lest we be confused, with
the subject matter. One can explore all sorts of sordid
subjects and yet explore them in a spirit of wholeness.
In man y ways, this was what Van Gogh did in his
painting; he created and redeemed the world through
his own vision, and much of that world was in disarray
and filled with sadness. He painted beyond his own
personal illness, from a center that was whole.
All of these words add up to a major part of what
we mean when we say that a work of art has a spiritual
quality. There is a "value-more" to one work of art
over another that is not rooted in comparison of
technique but rather in the evocation of your deepest
self in your relationship to the artwork. Something
within the work of art calls to a deep something within
you and you respond to it; a bonding takes place that
coaxes you to see the work of art as having a spiritual
quality. This "value-more" quality arises because of its
simplicity and clarity, its originality and disclosure of
the deeper self, its ability to evoke feeling, and
perhaps above all its harmony.

The spiritual quality of an art
work is not a matter of emotional
response but can be defined.
The spiritual quality of an artwork is thus not a matter of emotional response but can be defined. For
some people this definition may seem to rob the
spiritual of its mysterious quality, but this is not intended . Any work of art stands on its own and evokes
response from its viewers or hearers or actors. Defining the spiritual quality of art cannot rob the individual artwork of the quality nor of its creative and
evocative power. Mystery reigns in the ultimate knowledge that, even when you have defined a process in
understandable terms, a quality of transcendence remains which cannot be explained away.
This transcendence is known chiefly in the quality of
harmony, if one were to pinpoint it. The God who i
revealed according to the scriptures is a God who embraces the dualities of existence and transcends them
in such a way that they remain in tension with one
another. For example, God is portrayed as revealed
but remains hidden in the revelation and revealed in
the hiddenness. God is known, according to Nicholas
14

of Lyra, a brilliant thinker of the late middle ages, as
the One who is beyond the coincidence of opposites.
God is thus known, according to the tradition, in harmony which remains tension or tension which achieves
harmony. In God there is no in without an out, no
front without a back, no creation without destruction
(even if the destruction is of the primal Void); God is
known in the mutual coinherence and harmony of irreducible dualities, that is to say-in harmony. To
muse the harmony in an artwork thus offers
clear
reminder, loud echo, and bright mirror of the One
who is revealed in the history of Israel and in the person of Jesus the Christ.

a

C:

Going to Sleep in the Country:
Brigham Farm
Ten minutes after the light
is out, the silence, deep as the sky
at night, is broken-the dog in
the yard begins a series of howls
at a siren in the valley. My body
is prone but my mind is bold upright.
Mentally I pace the square room
from bed to corner firep lace, from
uncurtained window to bookcase
where a hundred volumes hold collected
pages and words, the focus of
a chronology of readers. Book titles
pair off with snatches of dinner
conversation. A character from
Dickens starts a new novel in my head.
The wide-pegged floorboards squeak
under the invisibility of waltzing
partners. The treadle of the old
Singer moves under an unseen foot.
Then the beginning of rain surrounds
the room until the steady purpose
of the downpour washes out the other
sounds. Like a candle-stump
whose flame is snuffed , my vi ions
shrink, settle ; like its thin
signature of smoke, restlessness
moves away out the door and down
the passage. Body and mind lie down
at last, together in the dark.

Luci Shaw
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A Lenten Contract
Richard lee

In March the administration of
Valparaiso University seasonably
stirs the Lenten meditations of its
faculty by sending them their annual contracts. A fiduciary provision in those contracts-" It is understood you are sympathetic with
the Christian intellectual tradition"-steadfastly reappears among
the more variable provisions for
our wages, benefits, and other harbingers of spring. Especially in a
season for giving things up and
taking things on, those University
contracts appropriately invite a
Lenten meditation.
"It is understood you are sympathetic with the Christian intellectual tradition" is spoken declaratively, not imperatively, but it has a
wholesomely hortatory ring. "Valparaiso University is proud of its
Christian heritage in the Lutheran
tradition," the faculty handbook
clarifies, "but it does not require a
specific religious subscription of its
faculty." In brief, the University
contracts do not require of the faculty what the University cannot require of anyone, namely Christian
faith, but the contracts do rightly
require respect for the Christian intellectual tradition.
The good judgment of the University is that a person may respect
and even profess Christian values
without confessing Christian faith
and that he may respect and even
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uphold the Christian intellectual
tradition without baptism into Jesus
Christ. A purging Lent is as good a
time as any to be reminded that
Christian virtues, Christian values,
the "Christian heritage," and "the
Christian intellectual tradition" are
not Christian faith. A faculty
member need not trust that he is
cherished by a gracious God to
know that human beings grow best
when they are sacrificially loved,
nor need he believe that a righteous God judges and redeems
human history to think that human
beings must be forgivably accountable to live at all.
In practical fact, it is sometimes
the case that faculty who are not
Christians are exemplary in their
practice of Christian virtues in their
personal lives and most trenchant
in their interpretation of the Christian intellectual tradition in their
professional lives. Contrarily, some
faithful Christians on the faculty
may know very little of "the Christian intellectual tradition" with
which they are exhorted to be sympathetic. This diarist, for example,
could put most of what he knows
of that intellectual tradition in his
Lenten lunchbox and still leave
room for his tuna fish sandwiches.
A University "in the Lutheran
tradition" wisely distinguishes between Christian faith and the
Christian intellectual tradition and
is properly reluctant to apply the
word "Christian" confessionally to
its faculty. But the proper distinction between faith and tradition
does not solve the problem of how
these different vitalities ought to be
related from day to day on the
campus. Probably nothing secularizes Lutheran colleges and universities quicker than turning the
nurture of Christian faith over to
religious professionals on the campus while the faculty gets on with
its intellectual work, and perhaps
nothing is less "sym pathetic with
the Christian intellectual tradition"

than the nurture of Christian faith
which does not arouse the mind to
its good works of comprehending,
clarifying, criticizing, and cleansing
the Christian intellectual tradition.
In some ways the relating of
Christian faith to the Christian intellectual tradition is like the more
general problem of relating faith to
the J udeo-Christian tradition as a
whole. Within that tradition the
faithful may freely disagree over
the ways a faithful person may support or oppose whatever is advanced in the very name of the
Judeo-Christian tradition itself. To
use the simplest current examples,
the faithful may freely disagree
whether their faith requires them
to support, say, prayer in public
schools, a cross placed in the public
square, or a ban on books critical
of Christianity in the public library.
The faithful can hardly be indifferent to a tradition which allows
them the freedom to be skeptical
about what others, no less faithful,
may believe is the Judeo-Christian
tradition . And that freedom for the
faithful depends upon their defending that same freedom for
those altogether outside faith.
In much the same way, the faithful at a University committed to
"the Christian intellectual tradition"
are sympathetic with that tradition
not because it is necessary to faith
or the same thing as faith but because within that intellectual tradition they may freely agree and disagree among themselves over their
answers to the variety of questions
that intellectual tradition puts to
mankind. And that freedom for
the faithful again depends upon
their accepting that same freedom
for those outside faith, often for all
the right reasons.
It is this contract of freedom for
faith and freedom from faith which
the University requires we keep
with one another, and it is a lively
Lenten discipline for all seasons.

••
••
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Review Essay

The Story,
The Sign
Jill Baumgaertner

Stones lor Ibarra
By Harriet Doerr. New Yo rk:
Penguin Books. 214 pp. $4.95
(paper).

Harriet Doerr is 74 years old and
Stones for Ibarra, winner of the
American Book Award for 1984, is
her first novel. It has been well
worth the wait, for in this extraordinary piece of fiction one finds
what one always wishes for in a
new book: strong characters, a captivating tale, a setting which develops almost as a character might,
and an intelligent author who
doesn't overmanipulate. Doerr tells
the story of Richard and Sara Everton in patches, interspersing the
narrative with independent stories
of other characters who figure
briefly in the Evertons' lives. Although chronology does create a
sense of the terrible inevitability of
the future, it is not so much the
cns1s or the climactic event which
interests the reader in this book.

Jill Baumgaertner teaches English at
Wheaton College.
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That Richard will die is clear by the
end of the second sentence. As in
any good book, it is the getting
there which makes Stones for Ibarra
such a fine piece of literature.
and
Sara
Everton
Richard
mortgage their home , quit their
jobs, and pack up for Ibarra,
Mexico, a tiny village where
Richard 's grandfather had owned
and run a now-flooded copper
mine. Their plan is to reopen the
mine and reclaim the house and
gardens which they have seen only
in old photographs. The mine had
at one time supported a life filled
with satins, laces, and tennis in the
garden, curiously elegant for a
place so far from urban culture.
But the photographs have fueled
the Evertons' vision and they, for
the moment at least, are able to use
the past image to create a vision of
their own future. The present intervenes, of course, and when they
arrive in Ibarra, they discover a dilapidated adobe house that has
neither plumbing nor electricity.
They settle in and the land, the
place, begins to claim them instead--so much so that six years
later Sara is able to describe Ibarra
as their real home.
If we were to be born again , she
thought, we would choose to be born
in this house, in that bed that is still
unmade. Born to work this mine,
whose name should be the Quien Sabe,
and to live in this mountain town of
one thousand souls. To hear church
bells at dawn, the mine whistle at
noon , and at first dark the jukebox in
the plaza. All we would want out of
being born again is this place to live
and die in, as we are living and dying
in it now.

The dying will be Richard's, for
within six years leukemia will stake
its final claim. It is not only a new
life which they set out to make for
themselves; it is also reconciliation
with death itself. Under such circumstances, time becomes both ally
and enemy.
The future in this novel is

forever pushing itself into the present. Before he even arrives in
Ibarra, Richard imagines the village
men standing at his gate, waiting
for work. The next morning he
awakens to shake hands with the
men he has imagined. This pattern
repeats itself throughout. In one of
the stories which interrupts the
narrative, Juan, a villager, "saw his
two selves, the future one who
stood at the mill and the present
one on the dam. The future Juan
from his vantage point stared
across the expanse of waste and
recognized the Juan of today, a
man of nineteen who wore a red
shirt, was cousin to an idiot, and
had recently fallen in love."
In these contexts the future is
positive. But for Sara the future
holds only the promise of Richard's
death and so she attempts to reject
time's terrible inevitability. She
makes up stories to ward off the
future, but in the process begins to
see that the stories themselves, dependent upon language, contain
ambiguities impossible to control.
Spanish is new for her. Her
teacher, Madre Petra, says during
one of the weekly Spanish lessons,
"Let
us
turn
to
irregular
verbs . . . . Please
conjugate
the
verb, to know ." Sara complies. Se,"
she says. And then she says, "No
se." I know. I do not know . Which
is it? When Sara tells Richard the
story she has constructed about
Madre Petra's girlhood, he asks her
if she is sure she is using Madre
Petra's words. Whatever she said,
Sara explains, "It's what I heard
her say."
The book continually asks the
question--what is truth? Sara fills
in the spaces of Madre Petra's
stories to create her own vision of
truth. She tries to pry more and
more information from the nun
about her past. The nun is reluctant, insisting that the past contains
images which have long fled. In return, Madre Petra is curious about
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the nature of Richard's illness and
Sara is similarly reluctant to give
her information. But in filling in
and finishing her fiction about the
nun's past, Sara "confronts and
strips off illusion" about her own
future. She is forced to see clearly
the images of "radiation, transfusion, hemorrhages"-Richard's future and the end of her life with
him.
The truth is that Richard will
die, but that is the truth for all
humankind, and it is a truth which
the Mexicans seem to understand
so much more profoundly than
Sara, who attempts to ignore all its
signs.
The signs, of course, are not always clear. At the beginning of the
novel, Richard misses the sign to
Ibarra. He asks directions of some
children and finds that they "turn
rigid as stone" and are "unable to
reconcile the Spanish words with
the aspect of the stranger." Language, a sign itself, becomes meaningless when put into a new context.

The novel shows the love
of a man and a woman
as a series of images.
Sometimes the Mexican landscape in this novel is peculiarly
existential and emblematic. Sara
and Richard enter a wilderness in
which the road keeps running out.
In their initial approach to Ibarra,
they are led across chasms and deserts. Only later do they discover
that the sign they had missed
would have led them to a direct
and simple route. "Medio desorientado," the Mexicans call them-halfdisoriented. But, then , the language is not their own; nor is the
region; nor are Mexican ways of
thinking and living.
Many mutual misinterpretations
later the Evertons come to understand the Mexican acceptance of
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ambiguity. A picnic with the priests
begins as festival and ends as
tragedy. Don't worry, the Mexicans
say to the Evertons. It has happened before this way-and it will
not prevent next year's picnic from
being celebrated. The event has
created story. Next year's event will
be next year's story and in a sense,
this year's story--of the boy burned
by the fireworks-will also be next
year's event. The story will enter
the lore and become historyIbarra's and the Evertons', because
they were there.
The lovely landscape in which
the picnic takes place is a type of
Eden, dreamlike in its lushness. "In
front of them, as if produced by
wishing or a dream, was a grassy
clearing below an earthen dam. It
was shadowed at one side by a
grove of oaks and bounded at the
other by the overflow from the
spillway. Here twenty or thirty
people strolled about on a flowering carpet of yellow weeds ....
Across the clearing, Sara saw the
old nun still in her chair, sitting in
the shade of trees, near a stream,
among flowers." A still life, this
brief respite for the nuns, the
priests, and the Evertons cannot
last. All they can do is accept it as
it comes. As they leave, Sara sees
the doves descend into the trees.
This book shows story operating
as a way of capturing the past and
living it as the present moment.
But it also shows two people creating their own story out of past
photographs and future images
and welding this narrative to the
narratives of an entire village to
create the history of a place. It
shows the quiet love between a man
and a woman as a series of images
and signs which themselves create
story: flowers blooming in the desert, a glass of beer shared, a gift of
flower pots. "What lasts?" it cries
out. Memory, story, and stones
piled at a sacred spot, it answers.

••
••

Insiders
John Steven Paul

Hurlyburly is a new play about
Hollywood by David Rabe, the
American playwright best known
for his Viet Nam trilogy: The Basic
Training of Pavlo Hummel, Sticks and
Bones, and Streamers. It's having a
good run at New York's Barrymore
Theatre. Though it is a pessimistic
and occasionally repulsive piece
about contemporary moral decadence, it is extraordinarily wellwritten, humorous, and challenging.
Rabe's play tried out at the
Goodman Studio in Chicago and
arrived on Broadway amidst a
great deal of hoopla. Newsweek
heralded it as a piece of "American
Theatre History." The production
did bring together an unusually
large number of young actors recognizable from their work in films:
William Hurt, Christopher Walken,
Harvey Keitel, and Sigourney
Weaver. (My favorite performance
was given by Jerry Stiller, of Stiller
and Meara fame, as Artie.) Hurlyburly was superbly staged by Mike
Nichols, the hottest director on
Broadway and an important artistic

John Steven Paul is a stage director
at Valparaiso University, where he
teaches in the Department of Speech
and Drama. He is the regular theatre
critic for The Cresset.
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force in American theatre and
films over the last twenty-five years.
By now, however, the play has outlived a number of less than fortunate cast changes (John Rubenstein
replaced Hurt, Ron Silver replaced
Walken and Susan Anton-believe
it or not-replaced Weaver) and
audiences are appreciating the play
for itself rather than its celebrated
cast members.
Hurlyburly is a situation tragicomedy about some days in the life
of an odd couple of casting directors. Eddie has recently divorced
his wife and is midway through a
life passage from disappointed
idealist to crusty cynic. He tries
desperately to articulate his existential pain, but his constant companions-cocaine, marijuana, and Jack
Daniels-make concentration difficult. Mickey, separated from his
wife, takes the comic view of their
decadent life. ("You shift your
point of view and what was horrible looks O.K.") He's always sober
enough to stick the needle of truth
into Eddie's overheated philosophical balloons. During the day, Eddie
and Mickey shuffle through stacks
of photographic composites looking
for the faces and bodies that the
American TV and film viewer will
find entertaining. At night, they
look for the faces and bodies with
which to entertain themselves in
their southern California townhouse.
Eddie and Mickey have a bunch
of nutty, southern California
friends. Artie is an aging screenwriter of middling talent. One day
Artie found Donna in the elevator
of his building and he brought her
over to Mickey and Eddie's for
them to play with. Donna is a teenage runaway who seems to be more
than willing to try anything. Phil is
a hopelessly unemployed and potentially psychotic actor, whose separation from his wife and children
is driving him dangerously crazy.
Bonnie is a club dancer whose
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specialty is a balloon act. Darlene, a
beautiful woman totally bewildered
by the complexities of her relationships, is seriously involved with
Eddie and dating Mickey. These
folks drop into the townhouse from
time to time to sort out their joys
and sorrows, hopes and fears, failures and successes-and to get a
free high from Eddie's cache of
controlled substances.

David Rabe's Hurlyburly
is a situation tragicomedy about days in
the life of an odd couple
of casting directors.
Rabe is more interested in savaging the Hollywood scene than in
making a plot. What story there is
revolves around Eddie's inexplicable loyalty to Phil. Phil is obviously
a brutish and, reportedly, a brutal
person. He is tormented by the repeated rejections by screen directors and the evictions by his wife
which lacerate his thin layer of selfconfidence. Though Phil is coarse,
untalented, and tedious, Eddie flatters him with testimonials to his
"authenticity," and strings him
along with promises of new scripts
to read and contacts to make.
When Phil's wife sues him for divorce, he seems on the brink of
personal disaster. To make him
feel better, Eddie arranges a blind
date for him with his friend Bonnie, a woman notorious for her
sexual appetite. But while they are
driving, Phil turns violent and
pushes Bonnie out of the moving
car.
Bonnie limps back to the townhouse to curse Eddie for having set
her up with his maniacal pal. When
Phil returns, Eddie excoriates him,
revealing almost inadvertantly the
depth of his contempt for the
actor. Shattered, Phil quits the

house, but returns once more
cradling his infant daughter in his
arms. By this time, Mickey and
Artie are present, and for a few
emotionally-charged moments, the
four men , each scarred in his own
way by adult experience, lovingly coo
and gurgle and pet the baby. They
celebrate her innocence and lament
the prospect of her maturation into
the kind of woman by which they
all feel tormented. Phil leaves to return the infant to its mother and, it
is learned later, to end his own life.
Act III opens on Eddie and Mickey walking in from the funeral.
The mail brings Phil's inept attempt at a cryptic suicide note. It is
addressed to Eddie and he becomes
obsessed with Phil's final communication to him, trying to convince
himself that somewhere in the last
words is Phil's insight into the mystery of life and death. Eddie's attachment to Phil has been pathetic
to watch; as Mickey points out,
Eddie kept Phil around only so that
he might always have someone
lower than himself within sight.
The play closes with Eddie disturbed by Mickey's truth, but
haunted by Phil's memory.
Rabe's subject is the Entertainment Industry and the sub-culture
that developed around it. He is a
New Yorker, who spent some time
in Los Angeles writing for films,
but he fled what he saw as a destructive environment, returning to
the relative sanity of New York
City. His derisive comic vision is
tinted by feelings of inter-coastal
superiority. Eddie and Mickey's
townhouse is Rabe's microcosm of
the world known to us as "Hollywood." We've never been there, but
it is reported out to us by the likes
of Johnny Carson and Rona Barrett, of "Entertainment Tonight"
and The National Enquirer. Hollywood is as much or more a state of
mind as a physical milieu, but it has
boundaries
nonetheless.
Rabe
names this state "Hurlyburly,"
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evoking images of warty-nosed
witches stirring up Macbeth's fate
in a boiling black cauldron.
Rabe sets out to depict this
world, in somethat the same way as
did the English playwrights who invented the Comedy of Manners in
the late seventeenth century.
George Etherege and William
Wycherley recorded the customs,
behavior, and language, in sum,
the manners of London's moneyed
society in the years after Charles I I
was restored to the throne in 1660.
The marks of this society were its
near complete insulation from the
world beyond London, its obsession
with conversation and linguistic
facility, its deep concern for public
image, and its preoccupation with
sexual dalliance. Later on, William
Congreve would label these accumulated behaviors as "The Way
of the World."
Like the London of the Restoration Comedy, Rabe's Hurlyburly is
a place almost entirely insulated
from the rest of the country by its
local concerns and preoccupations,
its patterns of work and recreation,
its values and standards of conduct,
even its language. All activity revolves around the production and
marketing of entertainment ware.
Ideas are generated, projects developed, arrangements discussed,
deals cut, audiences surveyed. The
legal tender is the image and those
who control images are the truly
affluent members of this society.
Substance is of limited value because it is not projectable. Filmed
images, however, are infinitely
manipulable. Everything, including
people, is valued to the extent that
it is a marketable image.
Insiders, sophisticated about the
way of this world, know about its
preference for images over substance. Eddie knows that Phil's
image is valuable because it looks
real. Any authentic humanity Phil
might possess is irrelevant. He is a
prop, Eddie tells him , that directors
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put in the background to give the
scene the appearance of reality.
But knowing that their existence is
only a network of images tortures
insiders like Eddie. They long for
substance, in spite of its declared
worthlessness. Images may be temporally valuable, but they are ultimately unsatisfying. Sex is at least
momentarily gratifying and even
substantial: one does, at least, grab
on to a real body. There is lots of
sex in Hurlyburly. When sex is not
available or no longer satisfying
there are drugs : drugs to stimulate
mental imagery, drugs to dull the
pain, drugs to get you up to work
and down to sleep, or at least up
and down. Bob Woodward has covered this territory very well in his
book on John Belushi, Wired.

Facility with a dependent
clause becomes the
measure of one's savoir
faire and intelligence.
Again, like the Restoration Comedies, the language of Hurlyburly is
very entertaining, even brilliant.
Rabe has elaborated standard English into a new argot that is aurally
impressive and intellectually tantalizing, but practically devoid of
meaning. The inhabitants of Hurtyburly express themselves with such
labyrinthine complexity that each
new sentence introduces new elements of suspense. Will this sentence come to an end? Is there
going to be a finite verb? Traditional figures of speech are replaced by long series of modifiers
that overwhelm the few substantives. Facility with a dependent
clause become the measure of one's
intelligence as well as one's savoir
faire.
As a tool for philosophical inquiry , this language is worthless.
Eddie tries to articulate his
thoughts, but his language only

points to the tangled state of his
mind. (Darlene to Eddie: "If your
manner of speech has any relation
to your state of mind, it's a wonder
you can tie your shoelace.")
Further, in Hurlyburly, articulateness itself has become a form of
obfuscation. Language is a defensive weapon, a kind of linguistic
wall inuring those on the inside.
Insiders are those who know what
everyone is talking about, who have
been around long enough to know
that words rarely correspond to
thought or feeling.
Rabe is suggesting that being on
the inside of Hurlyburly is the objective of these characters and
being insulated is the curse. Each
of them has retreated, drifted, or
relocated to the place. They have
separated not only from the places
of their birth, but also from their
families. They are divorced, or
separated, or in some other way cut
loose from formerly nurturing and
protective institutions. Now they
are inside that big projector that
flashes images out to viewing
screens across the country. But the
light that flashes out from Hurlyburly reflects any light coming in.
Rabe's bitter comedy emphasizes
the irony of the fact that this is the
community whose purpose it is to
make art that reflects society.
These are the people, Rabe says,
that make the movies in which we
expect to see ourselves. They don't
even know what we look like!
II

Back m Chicago, Evanston's
Northlight Theatre has given
Simon Gray's latest play, Quartermaine's Terms, its Midwest premier.
Gray, an Englishman, gives us five
scenes in the life of an English language school for foreigners, located
in Cambridge, England. The
characters are teachers. We meet
them as they gather in a combination lounge and locker room, a
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transitional space through which
they pass on the way to class and
on the way home from class. The
play covers approximately three
years' time, marked off in school
terms. St. John Quartermaine is
one of the teachers.
Neither the place nor the people
is insulated as they are in Hurlyburly,
but they are isolated, each from the
others, even while they occupy the
same room. The character trait is
particularly Chekhovian, as is the
play's central observation about
human beings: life's terms pass inexorably by and when we look up
they're gone.
The most striking thing about
Quarterrnaine's Terms is Gray's use of
a central character who is anonymous in all but the most superficial
respects. Quartermaine is so colorless that he is nearly invisible; he is
a middle-aged teacher of English
language, well-groomed, squareshouldered, polite, and reserved .
He is a ready friend, should anyone be interested, and willing companion, should anyone ask. Were it
not that he is a bit preoccupied and
prone to daydream , he would be a
good listener and a willing listener.
St. John is apparently a mediocre
teacher, at best. We know nothing
of his life outside the school; nor
are we tempted to speculate.
The other characters are quite
ordinary, too. But Gray takes care
to open up enough of their lives
outside the school to entertain us
with their continuing stories. In
fact, except for Quartermaine, each
of the teachers is defined by an element of life beyond the chool. At
each new term, the staff assembles
in the teachers' lounge to hear a report on the school's health from its
principal. The playwright uses
these assembly scenes to mark the
passage of time. We notice that one
of the younger teachers confronts
each new term plagued with a new
accidental 111Jury; another repeated ly restyles his facial hair; a
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third is pregnant, and then pregnant again . New chapters in their
stories are reported, both directly,
in the characters' own words, and
by the changes in their physical
posture, the relative steadiness of
their hands, the clarity of their
eyes, the lines on their faces. It is
always startling to see several years
of li fe telescoped into a few moments. The histories of individual
experience are always so clearly imprinted on the brow, like the serial
reliefs on the Egyptian tomb.

Simon Gray tells us in

Quarlermaine's Terms
that life's terms pass
inexorably by and when
we look up they're gone.
One of the teachers is Melanie
Garth, an unmarried and unhappy
woman who lives with her mother.
Melanie is a frowner, but her face
is still young and hopeful. In the
second scene, it is a wearier face
that reveals that mother and
daughter detest each other. Mother
loads daughter up with guilt to
keep her at home and daughter
openly resents it. A year or so later,
it is a grim Melanie who reports
that her mother has taken a fatal
fa ll down the stairs. Melanie is
vaguely implicated, but never
charged. Some months later, she
has joined a fundamentalist Christian society and has invited several
of the staff to evenings in the company of her charismatic friends. At
this point, her face is cheery, and
vacant. In the last scene, eighteen
months later, she sits at the conference table speechless, chainsmoking, haggard , and· ugly.
Another is Henry Windscape. All
British tweed and good form,
Henry · is the most professionally
learned of the staff members and
holds the senior academic position

in the school. He is handsome, distinguished, cultured, and compassionate, the stablest of the lot. He
takes great pride in teaching the
"British Life and Institutions"
course to his Swedish, German,
French, and Japanese students. But
Henry's great joy is his family,
around whose needs and interests
he organizes his life. His daughter
Susan, a bright and serious girl, is
a source of special pride. Henry reports regularly on Susan's progress
in studying for her "0-level" and
"A-level" examinations (achievement tests, to us Yanks). From
scene to scene, as Henry's pride in
Susan transforms into concern and
then dismay, it becomes clear that
the girl is abnormally upset by her
studies. She is dead, in the end, of
an unspecified brain disease and
Henry is much grayer.
As the co-principal of the school,
Eddie Loomis is most vitally concerned with the fluctuations in enrollment that reflect the health of
this private school. The other coprincipal is Thomas, Eddie's roommate and companion. Though
Thomas never appears, Eddie's
continual references to him lend
him an immanence that is nearly
palpable. Everyone's work depends
on the unseen Thomas. The years
show on Eddie most noticeably of
all. At the beginning he is a vigorous, plucky, and optimistic, if late
middle-aged, individual buoyed by
the success of his "flourishing"
school. In his final appearance,
after Thomas' death, Eddie is a
feeble old man, barely able to shuffle across the teachers' room. In his
last speech, he surrenders the reins
of the school to Henry Windscape.
The other stories that continue
from term to term are less striking,
more ordinary. Derek, a north
country chap who struggles by on
his parttime salary, is comically accident prone. One day he meets a
former girlfriend, they eventually
marry, and by the end he is permaThe Cresset

nent faculty at the school. Mark is
an aspiring novelist, who risks his
family life to pursue his artistic aspirations. His wife leaves him, taking the children with, and then returns . At the end, he is celebrating
the completion of the first draft of
the final revision of his first novel.
Anita is wed to something of a
philanderer, who is consumed by
the launching of his literary
magazine. At the end, they are reconciled, but Anita is ruefully aware
of the central irony of their relationship: when they were first
married her husband couldn't
stand the sight of her; now he
adores her, and she can't bear him .
St. John Quartermaine has no
continuing story, he simply continues. While the others' lives are
both grounded in and defined by
their existence beyond the school,
Quartermaine seems to have no
such life, and so no definition. At
the end of the day, or week, or
term, Quartermaine takes up his
accustomed position in an armchair
while his colleagues file out; when
they file back in, on the next morning or at the start of the next term,
he is there ahead of them. They
wonder if he might never have left.
To the others, the significance of
life lies beyond the teachers'
lounge: Melanie's mother, Mark's
novel , Henry's daughter, Anita's
husband, Derek's struggles, and
Eddie's mysterious Thomas. To
them the school is the classroom
and the students. The people, the
conversations, and the concerns of
the school's teachers' lounge are incidental and relatively insignificant.
They pay each other very little attention; they admit each other into
their lives only on their own terms.
Quartermaine has no other terms
than the ones given him by the
school. It is always "great to be
back" from a holiday. It is not that
he is so fascinated by and involved
in the lives of his colleagues, but
that he has nothing else. He is, as
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Anita says, "the perfect outsider" in
all their lives. Quartermaine is also
the school 's perfect insider, in that
his identity is defined by the world
inside. This is why it is particularly
sad that Henry's first official act as
principal is to fire him.
Hurlyburly
and
Quartermaine's
Terms are about as superficially dissimilar as any two plays one might
see in the space of a month. One a
bitter comedy, the other an ironic

drama, they both share in the
thematic legacy of Modernism:
Man cut off, alienated, insula ted,
isolated from the larger universe of
meaning. Eddie and Quartermaine
are entirely deprived of the outside
contact necessary for a definition of
their existence, and they sense itvaguely. Quartermaine might be
speaking for both of them when he
gasps the last words of the play. "0
Lord!"
Cl

Market Day in Reutlingen
They've staked canopies against the sun from every side
to filter yellow on Israeli limes and mound on rainbow mound of
lusciousness fresh-trucked-in from gardens nearer, just as
song erupts from students with guitars and "Opah Leierkastenmann."
Now a towering African in coral robes fifes counterpoint with
farmerwives and shoppers bartering by Kaiser Max's fountain
that juts from violet-frames and Ioden capes and hand-embroidered
sweaters, all splashed against trim banks of painted wagons. And
ah, the honied smells spilled from a thousand wicker baskets!
But something's imperfect as well. The ratio of men my age to
women? Or is it, they're too often wheeled by them? Or, suddenly,
one left to rest beside my bench, blanket tucked the length of him,
sleeves pinned flatly at the fringe, testing my weak German?
Still, with weather we do well awhile together. Then he brings up
war, when (he grins) "Wir waren Feinde," and I'm the listener,
having known that mostly via newsreel clips and Widow Ashbrook's
star back home in Indiana, one block over, long ago. Now I'm
picturing this square he paints as cratered then and smoking, red;
smelling past Italian roses, death; hearing bomb strikes drown the
screams of sons he couldn't save; thinking, thinking of my only one,
the age his "Joachim" would be today, if only .... Oh, oh,
how differently it might have gone for each, and us, one has to
wonder privately. And all at once this sun-warm, psychedelic,
singing morning's spell turns - sobering.

lois Reiner
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Up from
Pedagogy
Charles Vandersee
Dear Editor:
Last fall the final book we read
in my sophomore-level American
literature seminar was Ralph Ellison's 1952 novel Invisible Man. It
happens to be another of the perfect
novels that I've mentioned to you
from time to time, but I won't stop
now to try to define perfection.
Invisible Man raises the question
of who this young black guy is
who's telling the story of his recent
life (for one thing, he's us-that
familiar literary convention), but
we're also making some discoveries
about where he is. In the South, for
a while, is part of the answer, and
in Harlem for a couple of years.
But also in a new nation called the
United States, which Emerson and
Whitman , a hundred years earlier,
only partly explored and mapped.
Ellison's new topography has to
wait, in class, until the perplexed
mind of the narrator has sufficiently admitted us into his territory. As teacher, I was· rereading
the novel just ahead of the class,
since, as I've also mentioned, I

While doing research for The Letters
of Henry Adams, Charles Vandersee came across the origin of the word
speakeasy, and has lately published
same in the journal American Speech.
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have almost no memory.
o
farther along in this 560-page conundrum than page 17, I was startled into unexpected reflection .
Talking about his adolescence in an
u nnamed Southern town, Ellison's
protagonist says: "In those pre-invisible days I visualized myself as a
potential Booker T. Washington."
I knew that most of my students
would recognize the pioneer black
educator (a check confirmed this),
but I wondered where they first
met him (this I didn't ask). Was it
in school, in a "unit" on black
American history, or maybe at
home, in a copy of American Heritage? I wondered , because it came
back to me where I myself had first
met him, and when. Booker T.
Wash ington appeared, along with
another significant black man,
George Washington Carver, the
Georgia "peanut wizard ," in a book
that I first read at age six or seven,
Boy's Stories of Great Men, which my
parents probably ordered from the
place they got most of my books,
Concord ia Publishing House, 3558
South Jefferson Avenue, St. Louis,
Missouri.
Since it seems odd that a person
with no memory can produce all
that, let me digress . First, if reading is your greatest p leasure, and
your town has no bookstore, then
the catalog (we're now back in the
olden days) is your wish list, and
good Missouri Synod parents generally had only Concordia's.
Second, kids remember everything. The population of New York
City m the 1940 census was
7,454,995. Chicago was 3,396,808.
Not only did this obnoxious kid remember such stuff, he used it in
Miss Martha Bornemann's secondgrade class, when the twelve pupils
did their collective theme. "What
shall we write about this week?" she
would ask. "New York City," he
would say. "Who can give us the
first sentence?" she would ask, at
the blackboard, pretending · his

hand was invisible. "The population of New York City ts
7,454,995," he would say. He knew
that for sure, because his favorite
genre of literature was the almanac. If nobody else said anything, he would continue . "The
tallest building in New York City is
the Empire State Building."
Mild Miss Bornemann, from Columbus, Nebraska, had the decency
not to roll her eyes to the back of
her head in disgust, but I seem to
remember a sort of silence, which
upon reflection years later tu rned
out to mean, roughly, "Oh, shut
up."

Mild Miss Bornemann
had the decency not to
roll her eyes to the back
of her head in disgust.
Biography was also his favorite
genre. Biography, the almanac, the
dictionary, the atlas (later also the
Britannica, circa 1906, from h is
great-aunt in Chicago) were sim ultaneously his favorite genre, as
three persons were comfortably
one God . In Boys' Stories of Great
M en Tuskegee was as important as
New York City. So was Menlo Park,
New Jersey, where Thomas Alva
Edison worked nights in the lab
looking for the right filament. Also
Philadelphia,
where
John
Wanamaker opened a big department store, and Dearborn, Michigan, where in a little machine shop
Henry Ford was perfecting his
gasoline carriage.
Tuskegee, where Washington
was teaching agricu lture and selfsufficiency to egroes, was a place
I found only in Boys' Stories. I don't
recall running across Wash ington
or Carver in Lutheran parochial
school or public high school, although I may be wrong. In any
case, my way was the better way: to
see these two men between the
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covers of a red book that calmly
took them for granted as integral
parts of American history and as
equals of Ford, Edison, and the
John D. Rockefeller who taught
Sunday School every week.
Now, last summer I found Boys'
Stories of Great Men in the attic in
Indiana and brought it back, with a
pile of other old books, to Dogwood. No wonder, then, when
reading Ellison and seeing Booker
T. Washington, that I recognized
my childhood book as a symbol. It
was a symbol of what various scholars these days, especially E. D.
Hirsch, Jr. , of the University of
Virginia, have been calling "cultural literacy." This book had in it
things that grown-up Americans
were often informed about.
What aroused further musing on
this symbol was an incident uncannily timed for the day before we
began Invisible Man. In the student
paper appeared a letter to the
editor from the dean of AfroAmerican affairs, in which he referred to the "famous" Atlanta Exposition address of Booker T.
Washington. So I said to the class,
"You've seen our narrator say he
wanted to be like Booker T.
Washington. Mr. Puryear mentioned in the University journal yesterday the 'famous' Atlanta ~xposi
tion address of Washington. What
does that have to do with Invisible
Man?"
I was astonished. Three of the 24
students in the class (all white) had
heard of the address. I was betting
that none had. And they knew
roughly what it was about.
Washington• was giving practical,
cautious, avuncular (Uncle Tom)
advice: Don't leave the South.
Make obsequious friendship with
the white man. Be quiet, work
hard, gain respect, and things will
be all right. Stay right where you
are. It was 1895, the year before
Plessy v. Ferguson, not a time to be
militant.
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But nobody in class got the full
connection, which has to do with a
metaphor. Washington had told
blacks a parable about a ship lost in
the Atlantic, its men dying of thirst.
A passing ship sent a message,
"Cast down your bucket where you
are!" Puzzled, the thirsting men
cast down the bucket-and pulled
up fresh, sparkling water. They
were in the mouth of the Amazon .
Ellison's young narrator makes a
high school graduation speech, retelling with naive approval this
bucket story, but he ascribes it only
to a "great leader and educator"
and doesn 't mention Atlanta.

The nation young people
reside in is Pedagogy. I
find it barely possible
that they survive in
that chromium desert.
How did I, not schooled in black
cultural literacy, know who the
"great leader" was, and the occasion? Because teachers educate
themselves by reading criticism and
scholarship on the books they use.
At some time in the last 10 or 15
years I had found the Atlanta Exposition address.
Why was Paul Puryear calling it
"famous"? Probably to experts in
U.S. history it is famous. Probably,
in a shrewd rhetorical maneuver,
he was implying it should be famous
to Americans of college age. After
all, some pieces of oratory, such as
the 1863 Gettysburg dedication
speech, help us make sense of our
nation. Cultural literacy.
There is in Invisible Man, among
all the suggestive, decodable names,
the name "Emerson" affixed to a
young man who is well-meaning
but mainly an effete bundle of
neuroses , working in the office of
his oppressive father. I asked students what they knew of Ralph

Waldo Emerson's "American Scholar" address of 1837. What nation a
parent, and which a child? Looked
at another way, what happened to
New England culture in the generation or two after the vigor and
exploration of Concord?
What is the right age for kids to
begin "cultural literacy," to pick up
certain things, and where? The answer to "where," I don 't know,
though some say the schools. Since
the state can't assign children to
parents who will buy them neat
books and help them sound out
words, who treat reading and general information as natural and desirable, I suppose the schools are a
last sad resort.
But the peril! The nation young
people reside in is Pedagogy. For
weeks at Recording for the Blind
I've been reading a high school literature anthology-big white margins, decent selections, bright color
illustrations (sometimes of pictures
adults know). Also, however: vocabulary exercises, bland "discussion
questions," and tedious critical
analyses, all annoyances upon the
texts, like the contents of a spittoon
the Invisible Man pours over the
head of an unctious preacher. My
view is that questions and insight
should proceed from a teacher, not
from a textbook--especially not in
type as large as the readings themselves. I find it only remotely possible that people survive in the
chromium desert of Pedagogy.
So. I have, after proceeding thus
far, uncovered Boys' Stories of Great
Men .from the pile. I want to see
what great men I once found outside of school. It's a book I read
many times, and without knowing
it, was gaining some cultural literacy. I was entering a nation other
than Pedagogy-a real nation, not
Liechtenstein. And though _the author (it turns out to be Elsie E.
Egermeier) was choosing only
exemplary figures, and values
cherished by a particular subcul-
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ture, at least she put forth people
living their lives rather than existing for a pedagogue to analyze.
I noticed a date inside the cover,
in my own hand; the book was acquired in my seventh year. I was
becoming culturally literate about
these men, in this order: Lincoln,
Gorgas, Booker T. Washington,
Irving, Longfellow, James J. Hill,
Carnegie, Pasteur ("The French
Boy
Who
Thought
Things
Through"), William Carey ("The
Boy Who Translated the Bible in
Many Languages"), Edison, Burbank, Dwight Moody, Graham Bell,
Wanamaker, Ford, the Wright
brothers,
Rockefeller,
and
Paderewski.
But no Carver, whom I've known
nearly as long as Gideon, Ahab,
and Zacchaeus! What forgotten
book supplied me this black scientist who saved the Georgia economy by putting useless peanuts to
work?
It is, anyway, not a bad list, although I would change Carey's
preposition. In fact, replace him,
and Moody, and do with one less
captain of industry. But Ms. Egermeier has a more ample view of
the nation we live in than one
might expect from a Protestant
publisher, the Gospel Trumpet
Company, copyright 1931. And her
language, though passive-ridden, is
not condescending or vapid:
Through his lavish gifts colleges and
universities have been founded, rural
education among the neglected poor
has been encouraged, and farming
methods in the South have been improved. Also diseases have been
studied. With the means supplied by
the Rockefeller Institute for Medical
Research great discoveries such as the
cause of the yellow fever plague have
been made .. . .

I have no exhortation to issue
after this small excursus, stimulated
by a novel of a man named Ralph
Waldo Ellison, who, in another valuable piece of writing, "Hidden
Name and Complex Fate," alludes
24

both to his namesake and to
another quizzical American, Henry
James. Ellison there explains that
his mission as a novelist is to survey
his nation, "gauging the health of
the American promise" since the
vigor of its early democratic ideals.
But how do we arrange for kids
to digress into real nations, real
education, during the years when
they're able to remember almost
everything? In the humanities, we
might anathematize textbooks, ship
them to Liechtenstein. But often
teachers seem not able to function
without them, with confident vigor,
lost in an ocean or desert of fear
and ignorance, unable to judge
what things intelligent adults might
find valuable.

How do we arrange for
kids to digress into real
nations, real education?
Unfortunately, that leaves cultural literacy for later. Possibly I'm
not so gloomy as Jacques Ellul,
speaking of France, but it would be
foolish to deny his view of realityof what a kid does later, when he
leaves the nation of Pedagogy. The
world is the world of work, so the
country he wants to come home to
is Distraction: "He reads the comics, the tabloids, 'true romance'
magazines, and Paris Match." That
is, People of this week, just this
week.
From Dogwood, yours faithfully,

c.v.
P.S. I took Boys' Stories back to the
pile, and look! Ten Boys Who Became
Famous, by Basil Miller (Zondervan,
1946): Augustine, Luther, Bunyan,
Calvin, George Muller, C. T. Studd
(who are these two?), Grenfell, and
Chiang Kai-shek. "Booker T.
Washington-A Slave Who Became
Famous."
"George Washington
Carver-God's Ebony Scientist." ~=

Pinocchio and the
Illusion of Life
Richard Maxwell
The technical smoothness of
Walt Disney's animated films has
seemed cold or over-finished to
many critics. The best book on cartoons (published by MIT) is called
Before Mickey and stars Felix the
Cat, the whimsical creation of Otto
Mesmer. Felix's antics take place in
a land that seems to have been
doodled out at random. Felix himself is little more than a few expressively-placed ink blobs. The great
Warner Brothers cartoons are
more elaborate, but there is the
same atmosphere of offhand improvisation. Daffy Duck is vernacular cartooning: artifice as slang. He
and other Warner Brothers characters do not so much inhabit the
film frame as hang around in it.
Disney cartoons, by contrast, depict a world fully imagined rather
than sketched in; character, plot,
and above all movement are the
product of a formidab le corporate
endeavor where many specialists
have collaborated to produce a reality strangely near to ours---despite the obvious (and crucial) fantasy elements. This distinctive
realism is emphasized in the best
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book on the studio: Disney Animation: The Illusion of Life by two of its
veterans, Frank Thomas and Ollie
Jonston. The subtitle gives the
game away. After the novelty of
animation wore off, no one else in
the business thought that this process was intended to produce the illusion of life. A few exceptions
(perhaps Max Fleischer's rotoscoped figures) confirm the rule.
Generally animation provides an alternative world, not an imitation of
this one. The Disney studio alone
developed along realistic lines. By
the time of the feature-length
films, Disney animators had established a sophisticated set of rules
about how the motion of living
creatures could be rendered: as
though Disney had picked up
where Edward Muybridge's studies
of running horses and running
men had left off some fifty years
before.
The illusion of life is nowhere
better displayed than in Pinocchio. I
will focus on this film because it
was rereleased over the 1984
Christmas season-also because it is
usually considered Disney's finest
work in the genre. This judgment
is confirmed by the opening sequence where Pinocchio comes to
life. After an opening shot in which
a camera seems to move over the
roofs of a moonlit village, we enter
Gepetto's cottage. The cottage is
half workshop, half sleeping-quarters. It is stocked with wooden
carvings and with automatons,
especially mechanical clocks. The
kitten Figaro has a bed with a sort
of cat angel incised in the headboard; the bowl of the goldfish
Cleo is supported by an ornate
stand decorated with painted seahorses. Gepetto has been busy.
His ingenuity is underlined by
the presence of the cricket who
narrates the film. We may gag a little at Disney's cute name for himJiminy Cricket- but the decision to
choose this viewpoint is brilliant.
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The cricket experiences the obsessively worked details of Gepetto's
workshop as though each new twist
were an event. When he dances
with the figures on the clocks or
encounters a gargoyle on the rafters, we feel that something important is going on. The cricket's-eye
view is not the only one offered,
but we return to it throughout the
sequence. The animators thus establish an atmosphere not so much
of life as of potential life: the inanimate on the verge of self-consciousness and self-propulsion.

Jiminy Cricket narrates
Pinocchio. We may gag
a little at Disney's
cute name, but the
decision to choose this
viewpoint is brilliant.

All this prepares for the first
transformation of the puppet. 1 We
and the cricket watch as Gepetto
puts some finishing touches on
him; then there is a comic game
where the woodcarver becomes a
puppeteer. He makes his new creation walk, dance, and stalk Figaro
cat-style. Pinocchio is still a wooden
block. His creator animates him
wonderfully well but we are not allowed to forget that there are limits
to what a wooden block can do,
even with Gepetto's skilled assistance. Gepetto wishes-he cannot
decree-that the puppet come to
life. His wish is answered by the
beautiful Blue Fairy. Note that
while father may be responsible for
endowing the child with its physical
form, it is mother who grants him
a certain autonomy. 2
Pinocchio's birth is incomplete,
'"Marionette" might be a more accurate
term than "puppet," but the latter word
is almost always used with reference to
Pinocchio-and who am I to buck a trend?

however; for some reason the child
is defective, not quite a "real boy"
after all. The Blue Fairy neglects to
state why she can't finish the job
that Gepetto began. She just leaves
Pinocchio in limbo. It seems that
any further advance will have to be
earned by our hero.
Collodi, the writer of the original
story-published m the early
1880s-means to propose a good
nineteenth-century lesson. (A deadbeat in his youth, Collodi had become by the time of Pinocchio a renowned educational specialist.) Humanity must be won. The puppet's
dilemma thus encourages a sort of
moral striving deemed appropriate
to children as well as adults. The
lesson is preserved in Disney's cartoon, but qualified and broadened
by a concentrated fascination with
the depiction of movement.
The anirr.ators have discovered a
story perfect for presenting the
nuances of animated action. Pinocchio functions one way as a puppet on strings and another as a
self-propelled puppet. Both kinds
of movement relate to the movement of human bodies but neither
is altogether identified with it.
Pinocchio's defective birth becomes
an instrument for increasing our
understanding of what it means to
live in a body, to be endowed with
organic life. The moral lesson is
supplemented and partially subsumed by a biological one.
Disney Animation includes in passing a number of case studies from
Pinocchio. The authors consider Bill
Tytla's work on Stromboli. ("He
animated the head, body, hands,
and drapery all in different colors.
2

I am reminded of medieval and Renaissance controversies about how human
procreation worked. Pinocchio gives more
credit to mom than did most early students of this subject. As well as parents,
of course, Gepetto and the Blue Fairy
are stand-ins for the animators: they are
artists (magicians?) exploring the possibilities and limits of their art (or
magic ?) .
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It was not until he had each part
working, communicating, and moving properly that he would make
one
complete
drawing
in
black .... This character has been
criticized for moving too much,
making it hard to follow on the
screen at times, yet no cartoon
character has put over any better a
rich, volatile, and complete personality.") They show what care was
taken with an apparently simple
movement, Figaro struggling under
his sheets. They consider the special difficulties in animating the
Blue Fairy from live action studies.
("We did conceive several walks
[reminisced Hamilton Luske] and
one scene of her bending confidentially into a closeup with the Cricket-and that will be our best scene
of her. ")

The question of how and
whether Pinocchio will
complete his assumption
of organic life is at the
center of Disney's images.
But the problem of Pinocchio
himself remains the most striking.
The
animators
started
with
sketches of an obvious wooden
puppet, then threw them out and
reconceived the character more
ambiguously, as a puppet who
looked a great deal like a little boy.
The demands of cuteness had prevailed-but not disastrously. As
Thomas and Johnston observe, one
crucial point (aside from jointed
legs and wooden nose) keeps Pinocchio properly puppet-like : his eyes
are set so wide apart that even
when they move they have that
staring quality we expect from the
puppet or the automaton. The
kind of life with which Pinocchio is
endowed is thus perennially in
doubt. The question of whether
and how he will complete his as-
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sumption of orgamc life remams
central to Disney's images.
It also remains central to his
story. Collodi's tale is picaresque
and rambling; originally he conceived it as no more than
"episodes." The theme of the puppet/automaton endowed with an
ambiguous life-previously exploited by Kleist, Hoffman , Dickens, Poe and many others-is one
among many in Collodi's cornucopia. Disney edits the written
story drastically . Every stage of the
film's action emphasizes a new development in Pinocchio's status as a
living being.
On Stromboli's stage our hero
half-reverts to his original condition. He sings that he has no
strings while getting twisted up in
the strings of other puppets. Several of Stromboli's puppets are disturbingly sexy, which creates a supplementary confusion. The educated viewer will recall those
legends, often associated with Victorian travels to the Middle East,
where automatons perform the less
public functions of organic life.
Pinocchio's growing nose (he's been
a bad boy; he's lied and it shows) has
a sexual reference also. Good little
boys have short noses rather than
long ones; too obvious a display of
organic life will keep Pinocchio a
puppet forever. At least the Blue
Fairy tells him so . . . and yet it's
she who seems to make the nose
burst forth in the first place.
Pinocchio
IS
released
from
Stromboli and from his chastisement by the Blue Fairy only--on
his visit to Pleasure Island-to verge
on turning into a jackass. The hairy
ears and tail that grow out of his
puppet body remain with him almost to the film's end. On occasion
the puppet starts to bray, his neck
thrust forward with a sudden, prehensile, and ass-like movementeven while those wooden eyes stare.
Finally Pinocchio undertakes the
death-defying adventure which cu i-

minates m his rescuing Gepetto
from the whale's body. We could
hardly imagine a more thorough
engagement with organic life and
with organic motions, especially
sneezing and swallowing, magnified
to a gigantic scale. It is as though
we've had common and therefore
taken-for-granted aspects of our
own biological existence blown up
to the point where we, like the
animators, study them. Pinocchio's
transformation into a little boy now
depends on his ability to master the
movements of a body not his own.
Swallowed by Monstro, he must
provoke the monster to sneeze him
out. He succeeds in his efforts, is
washed ashore dead (???), and at
last is resurrected by the Blue
Fairy. Pinocchio achieves his first
total transformation. He IS unambiguously a little boy.

We end up in the film
with an encyclopedia of
movement but an
encyclopedia that has
taken narrative form.
I've meant to give some sense of
why the technical obsessions of the
Disney animators found their most
meaningful application in Pinocchio:
the interaction between Collodi's
fable (as edited by Disney) and the
problem of rendering the illusion
of life produces a whole that is
more than the sum of its parts. We
end up with an encyclopedia of
movement but an encyclopedia that
has been given narrative form. Disney does not dispense with Pinocchio's moral progress but he
superimposes on it a progress more
basic yet. Our hero learns to live at
ease in a body. Moreover he finds
out what kind of body it is.
Could not we take the argument
a step further yet? It seems implicit
in much of what I have said that an
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artiStiC allegory also informs Pinocchio, that the stages by which the
puppet comes to life parallel the
work of the animators. There are
hints of such an allegory throughout the film. Reflexive ponderings
are buried-{)r at least heavily disguised-for reasons that can be
guessed at.
It is hard to imitate life while
simultaneously inquiring into the
mechanisms by which the imitation
is performed. A few great novelistic
geniuses brought off this trick in
the nineteenth century; Disney and
his cohorts are not quite up there
with Dickens, Eliot, etc. This does
not mean that Disney is therefore
inferior to the self-conscious cartoonists. It may be a little too easy
at present for a sophisticated viewer to appreciate-let us say-the
great Warner Brothers cartoons.
Pirandello, Brecht, and Godard
break the illusion of life, thus provoking thought about the conventions by which we imitate and often
shape our lives; why can't Daffy
Duck do the same? And if Daffy
belongs with Pirandello, et a!., then
what room is there for naively
realistic Disney? An argument of
this kind may be workable.
All the same, Disney's realism has
irreplaceable value. Most cartoons
make us think about humanlycreated realities (societies, cartoons
as social products). Disney's cartoons can make us think about
biological realities, those givens
from which we begin. Artistic reflexivity is not so much banished as
redirected, used to focus our
awareness of organic life.
Finocchio above all explores a
particular childish experience of
the body while becoming a manifesto for illusion and imitation. No
other studio cou ld have done so
much with Collodi's little fable. It
took not just Gepetto, not just the
Blue Fairy, not just Pinocchio himself but Walt Disney to endow a
puppet with the life he merited. Cl
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Review Essay

Mysteries of
Faith and Doubt
Frederick A. Niedner, Jr.

Conversions
Edited by Hugh T. Kerr and John
M.
Mulder.
Grand Rapids:
Eerdmans. 265 pp. $12.95 (cloth),
$5.95 (paper).

Writers' Project during New Deal
days.
Though some similar themes appear in many of the accounts, each
conversion story is a unique web of
theological,
psychological,
and
sociological strands. The reader is
tempted at some points to jump to
seemingly obvious conclusions about
the interplay of these factors. Billy
Sunday, for example, was a loose-living and heavy-drinking young outfielder for the Ch icago White Sox
until one Sunday afternoon when,
still partly drunk, he followed a mission band to a revival and soon was
drawing enthusiastic crowds who
came not to see him catch and hit but
to watch and listen to the fabled
street-talk sermons, punctuated with
lots of body language, in which he
"scared the daylights out of sinners."

An atheist organization
expressed its members'

Hugh Kerr, editor of Theology
Today, and John Mulder, President
of Louisville Presbyterian Theological Seminary, have presented in
chronological order a collection of
fifty accounts of individual "conversions" to Christianity. Most of the accounts are autobiographical and each
is introduced with a brief historical
sketch. The collection begins with the
Apostle Paul and concludes with
Charles Colson. In between are the
famous and the not so famous. There
are Augustine, John Calvin, Albert
Schweitzer, and C. S. Lewis, but there
is also Henrietta Gant, a one-time
Louisiana slave whose conversion is
reported in a transcript of an interview conducted under the Federal

Frederick A. Neidner, Jr. teaches in
the Department of Theology at Valparaiso
University. H e is co-author (with David
G. Truemper) of Keeping the Faith: A
Guide to the Christian Message.

evaluation of Eldridge
Cleaver's conversion by
giving him its annual
Religious Hypocrite of
the Year award.
What is one to make of such a "conversion"? Is it the inevitable resolution of an adolescent identity crisis?
Or a reaction formation? Or a mere
shift from one mode of entertainment to another? Again, how might
one sort out the factors which led Eldridge Cleaver to announce that he
was born again and would leave his
exile in Paris to return to the U.S. so
as to face charges stemming from his
Black Panther days? An atheist organization expressed its members'
evaluation of Cleaver's conversion by
giving him its annual Religious
Hypocrite of the Year award.
In the end, however, none of the
stories submits all that easily to a pat
analysis. Conversion experiences, for
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all the clear vision they seem to provide for those who have them, are
mostly not very tidy or simple. Nor
do the stories recounted here tell of
many sudden, totally unexpected ,
and
unimaginable experiences.
Rather, most were a long time coming, a second birth being much like a
first in some ways. Seeds were planted along the way and nearly forgotten or even denied . But the growth
of a new life, initially hidden, was underway, and fina ll y there would
come the inevitable day when the
new life was born. Also like the first
birth, the second was often traumatic, accompanied by much pain and
many tears. Moreover, there was virtually always a mother and a midwife
for the twice-born. One of the most
consistent features of the conversion
stories told in these pages is the presence nearby of a faithful, patient,
Christian friend, spouse, or community. Indeed, it seems historically verifiable in these pages that "one who
has not the church for a mother has
not God for a Father."

This book of conversion
stories makes it plain
that there are many
more Christians in the
world who are twice-born
than would ever describe
themselves that way.

Yet, it is not the church, the friend,
the spouse, or the missionary who
converts the one born a second time.
It is finally God who authors the new
story. A frequent image in Conversions is the picture of God as one who
patiently and dogged ly follows after
the prodigal, the atheist, or the agnostic, slowly wearing down his or
,her resistance. From the perspective
of the converted, God seems to have
little else to do in all eternity but to
track down a lost or faith less one.
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Jesus, who told the parable of the
shepherd and the one lost sheep,
seems to have pictured the Father
si milarly. Francis Thompson, whose
conversion is recounted in The Hound
of Heaven, supplies the most memorable of such portraits in this collection:
I fled Him , down the nights and down
the days;
I fled Him , down the arches of the
years;
I fled Him, down the labyrinthine ways
Of my own mind ; and in the mist of
tears
I hid from Him , and under running
laughter.
Up vistaed hopes, I sped;
And shot, precipitated ,
Adown Titanic glooms of chasmed
fears,
From those strong Feet that followed,
followed after.
But with unhurrying chase,
and unperturbed pace,
Deliberate speed, majestic instancy,
They beat-and a Voice beat
More instant than the Feet" All things betray thee, who betrayest
Me."

Notably absent from these descriptions of conversion experiences are
hints of self-righteousness or betterthan-thou attitudes toward others,
both of which frequently characterize the verbal posturing of those
today who would describe themselves
as "born again." Perhaps the editors
have burnished the image of their
subjects by ed iting such talk out of
their collection. Then too, self-righteousness is more a behavior than a
language, and one would have to
examine the lives of the converted to
see evidence of its presence or absence. Nevertheless, the sampling of
conversion stories told here suggests
that the genuinely twice-born are
likely to be gentler, more patient, and
more tolerant than the person who
has not in any sense suffered for the
faith-not suffered because of the
faith but in order to have faith.
The tears described autobiographically in this book are haunting.
So common to these stories and so
plainly memorable to the born-again

are the times of unashamed and prolonged weeping th t one concludes
conversion is surely somehow related
to grief. That is not surprising, however, inasmuch as one buries, usually
forever , a self and a world when one
surrenders to a new order and a new
Lord and in the process takes on a
new identity. The old struggling person who is laid finally to rest must be
mourned so that his or her rest might
be real and so that the new man or
woman might have true peace. The
old Chuck Colson, White House
Plumber, had to die, and the new
Colson sobbed so long and so loud
into the night that he remembers literally fearing that he might wake a
couple sleeping in a house a hundred
yards away .
Finally, this book of conversion
stories makes it plainly evident that
there are many, many more Christians in the world who are twice-born
than would ever describe themselves
that way. Everyone who has grown
up with the questions of heaven and
earth answered neatly and surely by
the impenetrable structures of a
catechism, only to have that structure
spring leaks and the faith in it drain
completely-a happening so common at a university, even a Lutheran
one under the cross-and who then
·must endure the nights of doubt and
the fear of insanity before finally
piecing one's faith back together
from the fr·agments of the failed
structure, knows what it means to be
reborn.
It is a new person who survives a
struggle. It is a person whose faith is
now his or her own, not one inherited
from the authorities and kept by
means of m indless defense. It is a
person who knows pain, and so it is
a gentler, more compassionate person. It is a person who knows a "second naivete" and can enter the kingdom like a chi ld , for only children
can enter that kingdom. And it is a
person who can serve well as midwife
for the next generation who must
also be reborn.
Cl
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The Possibilities

Of Suzuki
Keith Paulson-Thorp
My two-year-old son knew exactly
what he wanted for Christmas. The
toy violin from Mexico was no longer
adequate; he wanted a "real" violin.
None of our friends was surprised
that Niels was so impatient to play an
instrument. He had been immersed
in music of all types since birth. It
seemed perfectly natural that he
would want to participate in the activities which constantly surround
him .
The time was when it was fairly
unusual for such a young child to be
given musical instruction . Today,
however, the question "where do we
find a teacher who is willing to take
on the challenge of a toddler" is readily answered. Most towns of any size
have in them , or nearby, a Suzuki
string program which is known for
the results it is able to achieve with
very young students. Taking one's
child to a Suzuki instructor is very
chic these days , but this popularity
did not come overnight. Because
Suzuki programs have become part
of American musical life gradually
but surefootedly, we may well expect
their impact to be rather permanent.
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The Suzuki philosophy of education was first implemented in Japan
several decades ago. It was not until
Japanese musicians began to win
American competitions and chairs in
prominent American orchestras that
educators here sat up and took
notice. Although primarily associated with the highly successful
string of violin programs which employed the Suzuki approach, Suzuki
is a philosophy that has been applied
with equal results in other aspects of
the arts and academics . One is as
likely to find a Suzuki program in piano or even mathematics,
and Suzuki journals are thriving.
The basic tenet of Suzuki is that
any supposedly difficult subject is
easier to grasp if it is a natural part
of one's environment and not a subject that is isolated or relegated to a
classroom situation. This is known as
the "mother-tongue" approach, for
Suzuki points out that children
develop the ability to converse in
their own language even without formal schooling.
Researchers have demonstrated
that the human brain grows in an
enriched environment. Teachers
have long recognized that students
whose exposure to subject matter is
limited to classroom situations do not
progress as quickly as those for whom
broad cultural experiences extend
into everyday life. Suzuki has programmed a response to this problem
into his approach and virtually demands that parents (although he
tends to speak only in terms of
mothers) take an active part in the
child's training.
In Japan, it has never been considered offensive for parents to mold
their children's lives. The closely knit
fabric of Japanese society and the
elaborate code of social behavior
which governs it facilitate such parental manipulation. In America the
idea that parents have a right to program their children's interests or activities, particularly in subjects of an
academic or artistic nature, was not

easily digested .
In the last decade, however, striking changes have occured in our society. Many observers have noted a
trend among university students
away from idealism and a cultural
conscience and toward an orientation
favoring material success. Recent
political trends suggest that this shift
in values is anything but localized.
This race for success has intensified
the fears of many parents that their
children won't be able to compete in
modern society and has driven them
to push their children as far and as
fast as possible. Suzuki provides a record of proven success and the hope
of instant "ability." The same cultural
developments that have led to the
phenomenon known as the "superbaby," whereby toddlers are exposed
to and allegedly learn complex
mathematics and foreign languages,
attract to Suzuki programs parents
who want their children to star in the
arts.
The commitment demanded from
parents of Suzuki-trained children is
tremendous. The mother-tongue approach demands not only that the
parent transport his child to the
weekly lesson, but also that he adapt
the home environment to make it fertile for productivity. He is responsible for seeing that the child devotes
a reasonable amount of attention to
his instrument. He supervises practice time in order not only to monitor
progress but also provide social reinforcement through personal involvement.
He must also provide the stimulation that will reinforce the child's desire to learn. This stimulation may
take the form of concert attendance
or the playing of recorded string
music. The parent must see that the
child hears music on a regular basis.
Suzuki provides recorded tapes of
the repertoire commonly used in his
method. Ideally, the parent, if he is
not himself trained in the subject,
should be studying along with the
child and thus become more sensitive
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to the developmental processes involved.
The fact that parents are required
to participate actively in the education of their children means that
many parents will be exposed to the
arts in a manner that was not available as part of their own upbringing.
These parents may continue their interest in the arts either because of
an awakened curiosity or out of their
dedication to the activities of their
children. There are occasionally
some parents who seem to take their
children to lessons and remain detached observers. Most children of
such parents are not likely to retain
interest in the program and will very
likely drop out.
The involvement of Suzuki parents usually frees the teacher to work
at a more consistent pace. It is not,
however, without some peculiar byproducts. Many parents, in an attempt to insure that their children
have every possible advantage and
opportunity,
have
not
only
smothered their children, but have
starved themselves. Some parents I
have known spend every available
minute taking their children to violin
lessons, piano lessons, gymnastics lessons, dance lessons, etc. and spend
little or no time attempting to
develop their own interests and cultural understanding.
During one conversation I discovered that a particularly zealous parent never reads books, attends concerts, or views exhibits unless they
are recommended by his child's
teacher as an important part of the
child's development. The parent has
no personal hobbies and views his
role exclusively in terms of his parental responsibilities. What will happen
to these parents who have so stunted
their own development when their
children have grown? One teacher
has suggested that we are going to
find ourselves with a generation that
at middle age knows nothing of life
beyond chauffeuring children and
writing checks!
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One of the most alarming side-effects is the number of parents who
have become virtual Suzuki fanatics.
One Suzuki teacher tells of being
grilled at length by a parent who was
afraid that the teaching techniques
to be employed in his child's lessons
would not be sufficiently orthodox,
as though a stigma should be attached to teachers who attempt to be
too original. Not only did this parent
insist that repertoire and approaches
be bona fide Suzuki, but he lectured
the teacher on the advantages of a
system the teacher had long endorsed! Most parents, even in this
situation, can be pacified as long as
the materials used in the lessons are
actually Suzuki publications, for they
generally know little about the actual
tenets and procedures of the approach itself. Suzuki has become a
designer label of music education
and a cultural status symbol.
The dedication of many Suzuki enthusiasts borders on the absurd. Most
of the magazines and catalogues published by Suzuki organizations are
plastered with Suzuki quotations,
rather as billboards in China once expounded the thoughts of Chairman
Mao. I am reminded of a student who
was afforded the opportunity to
study in England with the noted vio-

lin pedagogue Kato Havas. Returning, he confided that his greatest reservations about her method stemmed from the excesses of loyalty
shown by her students. He related
instances where her students sang
gospel songs substituting her name
in "appropriate" places, e.g. Everyone
· should know who Kato is.
Parental commitment not only
provides one of the secrets of
Suzuki's success, but also one of the
reasons his ideas have so often been
bastardized in this country. Many
teachers have been reticent to ask
parents to make this type of commitment, particularly if it means that
changes must be made at home to
accommodate the child's learning. It
is often easier for a teacher to adopt
the Suzuki name for its sales value
but to use only a limited part of the
educational techniques advocated.
The Suzuki approach generally
entails a large sample of rote learning. Memorization is of paramount
importance in the method. By avoiding the complexities of notation, a
child is free to concentrate on the
logistics of performance. There are
many so-called "Suzuki" programs
where rote teaching and memorized
performances are the only recognizable vestiges of Suzuki's philosophy.
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This, and the fact that many Suzuki
students advance technically but
without the accompanying mental
development (i.e. they don't learn to
read musical notation), explains
many of the objections constantly
made against Suzuki programs by
musicians at large.
Yet it is not reasonable to place the
blame for these problems entirely on
the Suzuki teaching method. To
teach Suzuki, the instructor must not
only have knowledge of the original
philosophy, he should be able to interpret those ideas and must understand the values of the art he is attempting to teach , values which are
not actually part of the Suzuki
technique but which may be easily
presented in this context. A competent Suzuki teacher must first and
foremost be a fine teacher and must
be aware that rote learning should
quickly be accompanied by teaching
of the conceptual and visual
mechanics of the art, mechanics without which a more vital appreciation
of art is not likely to develop .
The failure to teach children to
read and write music is not the only
criticism levied against Suzuki programs. While Suzuki presents us with
a very valuable approach to education, the fervor with which his ideas
are implemented generally extends
beyond the realm of educational
philosophy. Dyed-in-the-wool Suzuki types generally adhere to his performance techniques as though they
were the last word in violin playing.
Understood in that way, the Suzuki
approach can be badly limited and
can close off .to the student advances
in performance practice that have occurred during the last few decades .
Many teachers are quick to point out
that although they are ardent fans of
the mother-tonque philosophy of
teaching, they find it necessary to edit
the methods of performance that are
being taught in order to avoid development of bad technical and artistic habits.
Moreover, the standard Suzuki re-
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cordings and tapes present a child
with a far from ideal interpretation
of many musical styles, particularly
of the Baroque idiom, our understanding of which has undergone
serious reconditioning in recent
years. Witness the rash of authentic
recordings now on the market. An
inflexible approach to Suzuki would
perpetuate the stylistic misconceptions of the past and stifle the benefits
of continuing research and reflection .

If the Suzuki approach
is to survive the fad
stage, it will have to
be supple enough to
absorb changing musical
knowledge and attitudes.

If the Suzuki approach is to survive
the fad stage in which it currently
finds itself and become a permanent
and significant part of our musical
culture, it will have to be supple
enough to incorporate changing
knowledge and attitudes. In fact, Suzuki's concepts are very versatile, and
have been viewed as "carved in stone"
only by poorly equipped teachers.
Just as many new views of music
theory and music history are able to
incorporate past approaches as well
as competing contemporary approaches, so there is nothing inherent in the Suzuki approach to impede
the amalgamation of new technical
resources and performance practices .
Violinists and pianists, however,
comprise the most conservative wing
of musical culture. They tend to enshrine what they perceive to be absolute, i.e. what they have been taught
in the past (Suzuki has been around
long enough to fall into this category), and to resist new developments tooth and nail. As a result, the
expansion of Suzuki programs to in-

elude important new concepts is slow
in coming. As more and more
teachers begin to experiment with
Suzuki methods and bring to them
their
own
experiences
and
philosophies, a broadening of perspectives is bound to occur.
We might expect that children who
learn music as naturally as they learn
their own language would just as
naturally carry their involvement
with music throughout life. One of
the most interesting facets of the Suzuki craze, however, has been the
statistics on attrition. While a large
number of fine performers have
come from Suzuki training, the vast
majority of these students, like the
vast majority of traditionally trained
students, do not continue in music.
The big difference here is that students generally progress much
farther much faster. Because of this,
they are more likely to maintain an
interest in the field even if they do
not pursue it professionally. Many
students, having achieved so much
on their instrument with a seemingly
minimal effort, find that it does not
sustain their attention. Unlike language, music is a cultural convenience rather than a necessity, and
cannot maintain active involvement
by relying on the fact that we must all
use it.
We might ask ourselves whether
this educational approach is better
suited to the non-professional and if
it needs modification if it is to produce a substantial number of professionals. We should not be in too much
of a hurry to encourage Suzuki students to become professional players ,
however, for the job market does not
permit it. While it is significant that
we may have found a method of
music education which with careful
application is suited to the production of concert musicians, it is
perhaps more important that we
have found one which in any application is well-suited for making enjoyment of the art a part of general com~~
petence.
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Differences
Dot Nuechterlein
Sh-h-h-h, close the door. We are
about to discuss S-E-X.
You perhaps read the January
1985 Ann Landers column giving
the results of a write-in survey on
how American women feel about
the all-American pastime. Of the
thousands who wrote to her, 70 per
cent said that while they need and
enjoy the closeness and tenderness
that goes with it, the physical act of
intercourse they could do without.
Defending
herself
against
charges that these findings were
unscientific and therefore meaningless, Landers wrote that at the very
least they show there is much dissatisfaction and unhappiness in the
nation's bedrooms.
I suspect she is right. And I
think I know several reasons why.
As a teacher in family and
women's studies, I have been reading and talking and thinking about
marital relationships for some time.
We have precious little factual information on this topic, and what
does exist is not wholly reliable. I
know of no large-scale, cross-cultural, trans-century studies showing
definitively the sexual nature of
males and females in all cultures
and all time periods.
There are two problem areas to
explore: one is related to timing,
the other to communication.
As for the first, it is widely
acknowledged that on a given occasion, a female's response to sexual
stimuli is apt to be slower than a
male's, and that for mutual satisfaction it can be important to pay attention to pacing. What is not so
commonly understood , however, is
that their sexual maturation rates
tend to be different: whereas an
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adolescent male may be near the
peak of his need for physical
gratification, many females do not
experience the full force of sexual
desire until a decade or two later.
Some never do.
Young men sometimes appear
unable to focus on other things besides sex; young girls, on the other
hand , may be romantic and dreamy
about boys and may fantasize a
good deal about physical contact,
but their concerns tend to center
on emotional aspects, on feelings of
love and tenderness.
If all this is true, you can see
how we have the makings of a
classic misunderstanding and difference of expectation from the beginning. It leads to the truism:
"Boys play at love in order to get
sex, and girls play at sex in order
to get love." And since neither side
understands very well what is taking place, both may be in for disillusionment and disappointment.
Especially girls. If I can believe
what I am told and what I read
(often between the lines), many,
many young women come away
from their sexual initiation feeling,
"Is that all there is to that? What's
the big deal ?" And they think there
is something wrong with themselves, because they have learned
from every corner that sex is supposedly what makes the world go
around. And they come to think
that that's the way it will always be.
If a woman loves the guy in question and has a commitment to him
she may be willing to "do it for his
sake," but she may write the advice
columnist that in her opinion, sex
isn't really all it's cracked up to be.
The communication problem is
even more serious. There are more
studies on this, and it looks as
though many husband and wives
simply do not talk to each other all
that much . Or rather, husbands
don't. Actions may speak louder
than words, but women seem to
need both languages.

That shouldn't be surprising if
you remember that girls in our culture get used to the feeling that
boys like them when they are attractive and have sex appeal. And
they tend to feel terribly insecure
about themselves as a result. In
fact, I suspect most men have no
idea how angry and unhappy some
women get when they begin to discover that men seem to want only
one thing. Now a woman can tell
herself that her man isn't like that,
but if he doesn't say so, how can
she be sure? Particularly when the
inevitable signs of age and fading
beauty come along .
Ironically, and tragically, some
marriages crumble at this pointshe is more mature and beginning
to discover what the joys of sex are
all about, but he thinks she's the
same old girl, only older; and they
haven't developed the means for
communicating their deepest feelings and desires . They are stuck in
old patterns, or they don 't get together at all, and other grasses start
looking greener and more appealing by the hour.
Forget the Playboy/Cosmopolitan
propaganda: life is sustained and
made full when both sexes share
both physical and emotional union,
and that doesn't happen overnight.
Straightening it all out can take a
lot of time and effort, sometimes
for years. Of course, for those who
stumble onto the secrets of timing,
communication, and a few other
things it can be a whole lot of fun;
but even then, just when you think
you've got it all down pat, you find
more mysteries and dissimilarities
than you realized were possible.
Well, anyway, that's what I think.
But please feel free to disagree.
Maybe someday some researcher
will come and ask us all our opinions, and maybe then we will begin
to better understand this complex,
troublesome, and eternally fascinating subject. Meanwhile, vive Ia dif~ren~.
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